In the second part of his special report on the role played by the Russian Federation in the efforts of a Cyprus settlement, DEMETRIS PAPADOPOULOS looks at the Christofias’ presidency’s relations with Moscow and how, together, they saw off any hope an agreement.
Demetris Christofias ran in the 2008 presidential elections against Tassos Papadopoulos and Ioannis Kasoulides. The ballot yielded a surprise result. Tassos Papadopoulos, widely considered the favourite, finished third in the first round of voting and was excluded from the running.
Kasoulides had agreed to form a coalition with DIKO leader Marios Garoyian, but at the last moment Tassos Papadopoulos intervened, broke up the agreement between DIKO and Kasoulides, and led DIKO into a coalition with Christofias. Papadopoulos acted out of concern that Kasoulides would co-operate with the West to bring the Annan plan back to life, negating his own policies. Papadopoulos felt safer with Christofias because he knew Christofias had previously co-operated with him to kill off the Annan plan.
Christofias was elected President, and formed a governing coalition with DIKO and EDEK. The strategy outlined by AKEL since 1960 for the formation of an anti-Western front in alliance with the parties of the centre became a reality, under AKEL leadership for the first time.
Christofias was the first pure-bred pro-Russian president in the history of Cyprus. Despite the fact that the Russian regime had become oligarchic and had renounced the country’s communist past, to Christofias Russia remained the “mother country”.
Christofias never tried to hide his adoration of Russia. “I count myself among the large numbers of people who consider themselves friends of Russia. We Cypriots who studied in Russia during various periods, are possessed throughout our lives of a sincere love and gratitude towards that great country and her people, as well as admiration for her rich culture and heroic history.”(1)
The Russian government invited Christofias on an official visit to Moscow in November 2008. Christofias himself considered his return to Moscow, in the capacity of President of the Republic of Cyprus, as one of the most important moments in his life.
During a joint press conference held with then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Christofias, practically in tears, spoke of his studies in the Soviet Union which, as he stated, formed his political personality, and thanked AKEL and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the relationship between which had originally brought him to Moscow, “to this city that I love, as I love Nicosia”. Christofias thanked the Russian leadership for its “selfless and constant support, which is so salvational for Cyprus”. This is, he said, the “ceaseless support of the Russian Federation, formerly of the Soviet Union, on the same basis of principle, for the struggle of the Cypriot people to rid themselves of occupation, re-unify their country, restore human rights and rid themselves of colonialism, a position of support in the UN Security Council, as well as in all international organisations”.
Christofias referred to the crisis in the relations between NATO and Russia caused by Western plans to set up an anti-missile defence umbrella over eastern Europe, taking a clearly pro-Russian position. He said: “In my opinion, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there is no longer a reason for the existence of NATO. Yet it exists, and attempts to be so closely tied to the EU as to involve the EU into adventures undertaken by NATO. I consider this unacceptable.”(2)
Christofias declared himself proud of the fact that Cyprus, as a member of the EU, “is one of the two or three member states which is not associated and will not become associated with NATO, at least as long as my government is in power, and I wish to believe the same of the governments that follow.”(3)
Christofias was deeply anti-Western and anti-European, and as a member of the European Council he made no secret of the fact he defended Russian interests, as far as that was possible and feasible. “As President of the Republic of Cyprus, I have many times been presented with the opportunity to defend Russia in various forums, not excluding meetings of the guiding instruments of the EU, fending off attacks against her.”(4)
He defended Russian interests even when those ran against the interests of Cyprus, applying to Russia the same dogma that the Soviet Union had imposed on satellite Communist parties, a dogma that placed the interests of international communism above the interests of national states.
One example of this was the position Cyprus held, breaking EU unanimity, in resolutions condemning Russia for agitating for the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.
The resolutions, which have been repeated almost unaltered since 2009, state the following:
• The right of displaced persons to return to their homes is recognised,
• Respect of their rights to their property is emphasised,
• Colonisation of the areas placed under the control of the secessionists with the help of the Russian army is condemned.(5)
Russian policy towards Abkhazia and Ossetia is similar to Turkish policy towards Cyprus. In spite of which fact, Cyprus, a country which has invested so much in the resolutions of the UN, abstained from voting in the General Assembly on the issue of Georgia, breaking EU unanimity, siding instead with a multitude of Third World countries. Turkey also abstained, because she faces similar problems in Cyprus. Israel abstained because of the policy that country follows on Palestine. Cyprus was the only country that voted against her own national interests, out of subservience to a third country: Russia.(6)
Cyprus’ subservience to Russia exposed the country internationally on several occasions. A very characteristic example was the collusion of the Cypriot state in the escape of Christopher Metsos. An international warrant for Metsos’ arrest had been issued on suspicion of his involvement in money laundering, and was executed upon his arrival at Larnaka Airport. He was also wanted for espionage in the United States on behalf of Russia.
Finally, Christofias’ dependence on Moscow became the cause of his political downfall. His refusal to turn over the confiscated cargo of the ship Monchegorsk, which had been carrying explosives from Iran to Syria in violation of international embargoes, led to the explosion in Mari and the destruction of two thirds of the country’s power generation capacity in July 2011.
2. Russia and the Christofias – Talat talks
The election of Christofias to the presidency sparked great expectations for a Cyprus settlement. The failure in 2004 had been blamed on Papadopoulos, not on AKEL. Christofias’ running for President had been widely considered to be an attempt by AKEL to correct its error in the 2004 referendum.
The Christofias presidency coincided with Talat’s ‘presidency’. He was also leader of AKEL’s sister Turkish Cypriot party, CTP. AKEL, because of its internationalist character, had nurtured a culture of co-existence and rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots and had kept the solution at the centre of its rhetoric, blaming imperialism for the fact that it had not been achieved.
Immediately after his election, Christofias made some decisions which would facilitate rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriot community, such as the unblocking of the process for opening new checkpoints on Ledra Street and in Limnitis. These moves were seen as indications of Christofias’ commitment to solving the Cyprus issue.
The favourable circumstances had one weakness: The dependence of Christofias on Russia. This dependence multiplied Russia’s influence over Cyprus. Russia continued to lack any motive for facilitating the solution. On the contrary, she continued to have serious reasons to undermine it.
Christofias succeeded in combining the pro-solution culture of AKEL with Moscow’s strategy for maintaining the status quo. Moscow’s rhetoric since 1974 had professed support of the negotiations, which Moscow undermined in practice. Christofias would go on to apply exactly the same tactics:
I. A clear position in favour of solution, but insistence on negotiations without time-frames – that is, on open-ended negotiations.
II. Negotiations without outside intervention, which meant without the involvement or mediation of the West.
III. The agreement should be the result of the free will of the two communities, should it ever occur, without any pressure exerted by time or developments.
IV. The agreement should be based on the UN resolutions, which had hitherto only served to maintain the status quo.
V. The UN Security Council, which is the only international instrument concerned with the Cyprus issue in which Russia takes an effective part, should play an important role.
Within the framework of this strategy, the solution of the Cyprus issue was impossible. The characteristics of the Cyprus issue had not changed since its creation: it was a problem of the West, and its solution was not possible without the contribution and the support of the West. Therefore, with Christofias remaining deeply anti-Western and sentimentally dependent on Russia, a solution was not feasible.
Christofias met Talat for the first time in March 2008. They agreed to begin a process of investigative negotiations at the level of representatives of the leaders of the two communities, in order to prepare the ground for direct talks.
In June 2008, within the context of a visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs Markos Kyprianou to Moscow, held in preparation of Christofias’ pending visit, Russia again defined her “principles” on the solution of the Cyprus issue. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a statement saying that “we have confirmed our steadfast adherence to the settlement of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions and of voluntary agreement between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community.”
Questioned about the role of Russia within the Security Council in relation to American and British efforts to take the initiative, Lavrov replied:
“Neither are we attempting to usurp the roles of others, nor can anyone else usurp our role. The central role in the Cyprus issue belongs to the UN Security Council, to the five Permanent Members of the Council which can work exclusively on the basis of unanimity. And in that light, I see no possibility for the Security Council to support any decision which will not be the product of agreement of the Cypriot parties themselves. Precisely those parties should exert intensive efforts so as to agree on the parameters of the settlement between them on a voluntary basis and of course on the basis of those principles adopted by the United Nations. Russia salutes the dialogue which has recommenced between the two parties in Cyprus and we will vigorously support the effort for its development and successful conclusion.”(7)
During Christofias’ visit to Moscow in November 2008, a political declaration of co-operation between the two countries was signed. Concerning the Cyprus issue, the basic Russian position was adopted, which stated that “as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, Russia will continue to support the achievement of a solution mutually agreed between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, without arbitration or artificial time-frames, securing at the same time the Cypriot ownership of the negotiation procedure.”(8)
Direct talks between Christofias and Talat commenced on September 11th 2008. Over the next 12 months, they met on 41 occasions and sufficient progress was achieved for the talks to proceed to the second and definitive stage, that of the give-and-take procedure. Because elections in the occupied areas were imminent in April 2010 and it was expected that Mehmet Ali Talat would lose to the hardliner Derviş Eroğlu, the UN strove to escalate the procedure, with the aim of reaching a conclusion by the end of 2009. September 10th 2009 was fixed as the commencement date for the second round of negotiations.
In the meantime, the possibility of the negotiations coming to a positive conclusion had caused a reaction of the pro-Russia journalist lobby in Athens. In July 2009 in Nicosia, journalist Demetris Constantakopoulos presented his book “Cyprus in a Trap” which was a sequel to his previous book “The Seizure of Cyprus”.
Speaking at the book presentation, the author said:
“Since AKEL declare themselves to be Marxist-Leninists, why do they not make public what is being discussed in the talks with Talat, when the first thing Lenin did during his talks with the Germans was to publish the minutes of the talks?”(9) By coincidence or not, six weeks later, all documents of the talks were leaked to the Press…
On the eve of the beginning of the second round of the talks, Michalis Ignatiou, Washington correspondent of Mega TV, Athens newspaper Ethnos and Phileleftheros, announced during Mega’s news show that he had all documentation of the talks in his possession. On the next day, Phileleftheros newspaper ran a report from New York with Ignatiou’s byline on the front page, according to which Christofias was under pressure to accept arbitration.
The claim was “substantiated” by the content of the minutes of a conversation between UN Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe with UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer. However, in order to support his conclusions, Ignatiou distorted the content of the document in translation.
The minutes mentioned that “Downer had been given instructions [by Pascoe] to inject ideas into the process ‘whilst ensuring that the parties retained ownership of the talks’” (the underlined phrase is recorded in the minutes within quotation marks, reporting what the Deputy UN Secretary General Pascoe actually said).
Ignatiou rendered this reference as follows: “Deputy UN Secretary General reveals that UN representative Alexander Downer ‘had been given instructions to inject ideas into the process, but to do so in such a way that the parties think that they are retaining ownership of the talks’, which reveals the intention to arbitrate behind the scenes.”(10)
Distorting the text of the minutes, Ignatiou rendered what Pascoe said within quotation marks, but omitting the words “whilst ensuring that the parties retained” and arbitrarily replacing them with the phrase “but to do so in such a way that the parties think they are retaining”.
This was a deliberate distortion of the text, intended to support the position that the UN had plans for arbitration, a process which had been thoroughly demonised in public discourse in Cyprus during and after the solution efforts in 2004, while the original text leads to the opposite conclusion.
The article in Phileleftheros began a new round of public discussion of the mediators’ “bad intentions” and of the “danger of arbitration”.
The documents which had been published were part of a total of 6500 documents hacked from the email account of Alexander Downer’s personal assistant. The documents were gradually leaked to other media. This was a clear attempt to undermine the talks.
The United Nations blamed the Cypriot secret service KYP for the stealing of the documents. The Cypriot government attempted to convince the UN that the documents had been leaked from within the UN in New York, but an investigation by the international organisation’s own experts traced the leak to Cyprus.(11)
It is today accepted that the emails had been stolen by KYP, but the Christofias administration denied it had anything to do with the leak. Moreover, the documents were eventually used against the Christofias administration.
On the other hand, despite the fact that the hacking violated international conventions and EU regulations, as well as the laws of the Republic of Cyprus itself, the government did not condemn it, let alone hold a criminal investigation to find out how it happened.
The United Nations knew that Phileleftheros possessed all the documents, and Alexander Downer informed Christofias. Phileleftheros, despite having been the first newspaper to reveal the documents and despite possessing the whole set, ceased publication, which however continued in other media. The interruption in Phileleftheros’ publication of the documents convinced Downer that the Presidential Palace had influence over whoever possessed the documents.
It is, however, doubtful that the government would be so rash as to leak all documents of the talks, which would, sooner or later, be used against it. The mass leak of the documents was an act of sabotage against the talks. That was not Christofias’ tactics. The government did not want quick results, but wanted to keep the talks.
Information from a source within KYP seems to solve the puzzle. According to the source, the Christofias administration shared all documents of the talks, including those stolen by KYP, with the Russian embassy. As further developments proved, it was Russia that was undermining the status and prospects of the talks.
In September 2009, Christofias went to New York to address the UN General Assembly. His strategy was aimed at frustrating the UN plans for intensifying the procedure. On his arrival in New York he stated: “I am not a salesman and in no case do I have selling off homelands in mind” and asserted that “We will not accept arbitration, or pressing time frames”.(12)
In his address to the General Assembly on September 24th 2009, he emphatically focused on rejeing time-frames and arbitration, while repeating that Turkey was not ready for a solution.
In New York, Christofias met with Lavrov. After the meeting he stated that “Russia stands unreservedly in favour of the application of principles to the solution of the Cyprus issue, in favour of the United Nations resolutions, and our views coincide as far as the Cyprus issue is concerned”.(13)
Basically, Christofias agreed with Lavrov that he would continue on the same track with open-ended talks, without any mediatory role assigned to the United Nations.
A few days later, on October 1st, speaking in Nicosia, Christofias said: “I will in absolutely no case ever accept arbitration and asphyxiating time-frames. And this message is directed towards all quarters, including the United Nations Secretariat.”(14)
Justifying his unwillingness to enter intensive negotiations, Christofias cited his busy schedule. In a National Council briefing, he stated that “Talat is like Queen Elizabeth. He is only concerned with the Cyprus issue. I, as President of the Republic of Cyprus, have to deal with internal governance, internal problems and with the problems of the economy.”(15)
On November 4th 2009, Lavrov once again visited Cyprus and had talks with Christofias, who called the meeting “wonderful in all senses of the word”. Christofias said that at the talks, there had been complete coincidence of opinion with the Russian Federation, on the Cyprus issue as well as on international matters.(16)
According to information supplied to Phileleftheros, Lavrov “reminded his Cypriot interlocutors that in 2004 he had warned Nicosia not to accept arbitration”. Christofias’ reply to this reminder was that “we will not accept arbitration now”.
According to Phileleftheros, the Russian Foreign Minister reported that his country will not accept time frames or a solution of the Cyprus issue outside the parameters outlined by the UN resolutions and international law. Lavrov also repeated that Moscow agreed with the Cypriot position in relation to time schedules, while he emphasised to his interlocutors that there is no such thing as a last chance for a solution.(17)
In statements he made after his talks at the Foreign Ministry, Lavrov referred to the need for adherence to what had been agreed on the procedure for solving the Cyprus issue, without outside intervention, artificial time frames or arbitration:
“The two sides in Cyprus must themselves find the formula for settling the issue. The final settlement formula must be in the interest of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the international community should play an assisting role, cannot impose any recipes or formulas, and cannot impose artificial time schedules.”(18)
On December 21st 2009, Christofias publicly clarified that “there is no goal to solve the Cyprus issue before the elections in the occupied areas, and consequently we will continue the negotiations after the elections with whoever the Turkish Cypriot community elects to lead it.”(19)
The UN insisted on its plans as far as timing was concerned, and secured Christofias’ assent to the commencement of intensified talks in January 2010. The time frame within which the UN planned to reach an overall agreement was moved to March, just before the Turkish Cypriot elections.
On January 4th 2010, the Turkish side submitted a document containing a set of proposals for negotiation. The proposals were the most conciliatory and reasonable ever submitted by the Turkish side. The submission of the document was an indication of Turkey’s intention to push for a solution in the ensuing period.
Elements of the document were leaked in distorted form to the Turkish press, and were re-published in the Greek Cypriot press in a negative light. After the publication of the information, Christofias called an extraordinary Party Leaders’ Council (10/1/10). Within the negative climate which had been created, it was unanimously decided that the document was a “public relations ruse by Turkey”. According to statements by Government Spokesman Stefanos Stefanou, the Leaders’ Council concluded that the proposals were “unacceptable, and far distant from what had been agreed upon for a solution based on bizonal bicommunal federation”. Therefore the document could not even be considered as a basis for discussion.(20)
Christofias sent accusatory letters to the leaders of the the five permanent members of the Security Council and of the core members of the EU, comparing the content of the Turkish proposals to sections of the Annan plan. The objection raised by Christofias could have been submitted within the framework of negotiations, not in correspondence with foreign leaders.(21) Therefore, no foreign leader paid the letter any attention with the sole exception of Russian President Medvedev, who replied to the letter a month and a half after its despatch.
According to Government Spokesman Stefanos Stefanou, Medvedev expressed “Russia’s appreciation of the President’s position in the talks” and “repeated Russia’s support of the position that the solution of the Cyprus issue can only be found by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, and that any attempts to impose ready-made recipes for a solution, including any artificial negotiation framework or exercise of outside pressure on the two communities, are counter-productive.”(22)
The intensive talks in January generally concerned the issue of governance, were made on the basis of the the “unacceptable” Turkish document, and resulted in important convergences. These are the much vaunted Christofias – Talat convergences, which are so often held up by AKEL as an achievement of the Christofias presidency.
Ban Ki-Moon, encouraged by these results, visited Cyprus on January 31st 2010, intending to announce the convergences and secure continuation of the negotiations, with the prospect of a conference in March, before the elections in the occupied areas.
In spite of the pressures exerted, Christofias refused the codification and publication of the convergences. Ban Ki-Moon arrived in Cyprus almost unwelcomed, and was subjected to humiliating treatment by the media because of a red carpet that Talat had had rolled out for the welcome of the Secretary General to his office.
Addressing the Secretary General at the dinner given in his honour at the Presidential Palace, Christofias said the following: “The role of the United Nations is to facilitate the procedure. This should be consistently adhered to, having in mind lessons from the recent past concerning mediation and arbitration, which have led to bitter experiences and serious problems”.(23)
Ban Ki-Moon’s mission concluded with a generally worded announcement by Christofias and Talat and, in substance, was a complete failure. In April 2010 Talat lost the elections and Derviş Eroğlu was elected leader of the Turkish Cypriots.
In his report on his Good Services, the Secretary General mentioned that he would pursue the objective of a solution by the end of 2010, and within this framework he would, in the coming months, closely monitor the progress noted in the negotiations and submit a supplementary report to the Security Council.
In June 2010, the Russian side intervened in the Security Council to make sure that no reference was made to time in the motion to renew the mandate of UNFICYP.
Referring to the approval of the motion for renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP, the Cyprus News Agency correspondent in New York reported:
“As is known, after diplomatic efforts by Cyprus, but also with the support of Russia, important changes were noted which leave no hints at time schedules, nor connect the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP in December to the course of the Good Offices.”(24)
Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou visited Moscow at the end of June 2010 and expressed “the gratitude of the Republic of Cyprus for the steadfast support of Russia, a position of principle which is founded on respect for the resolutions of the United Nations on the Cyprus issue. […] Russia has assisted so that the correct terms were used and no unacceptable provisions were introduced. For us, the support of Russia, which made sure that no time frames were included which would undermine the negotiation procedure, is very important”.
On his part, Lavrov stated that “Russia would not take a stand in favour of defining strict time frames for completing the talks on the achievement of an agreement on the Cyprus issue.”(25)
At the end of July 2010, Chritofias submitted a proposal for promoting the solution procedure, aligned along three axes. The first concerned the negotiation procedure, the second proposed the return of Famagusta, opening the port and unblocking chapters of Turkey’s accession procedure, and the third was a re-iteration of the 1974 Soviet proposal for an international conference.
Among the whole of the international community, Russia was the only country to salute the Christofias proposal. Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador A. A. Nesterenko, referred to President Christofias’ moves as “an important step in the direction of accelerating the negotiation procedure” and added that “any attempt to impose time frames or introduce any form of outside arbitration does not contribute to the ongoing effort.”
In October 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Cyprus, and awarded Christofias with a medal, calling him “a great friend of the Russian Federation”.
Christofias replied, stating: “I am obviously moved by this ultimate honour you bestow upon me by presenting me with the Order of Friendship. Russia and the Russian people are in my soul. I acquired my intellectual lights in Moscow.”
Medvedev’s references to the Cyprus issue were confined to a general description of the standing Russian position:
“Russia’s position on the Cyprus issue remains unchanged, and we are in favour of the achievement of a solution wihtout outside pressure, as is usual in the international community, and the goal is, as the President has mentioned, a unified state with a single sovereignty and a single international personality.”
The goal of a solution by the end of 2010 was not achieved. Cyprus entered a period of economic recession, which was intensified in the summer of 2011 because of the explosion in Mari. Christofias lost every trace of credibility at home and abroad, and ended his term of office in disgrace.
The sequence of events leads to the following conclusions:
Demonisation of time-frames and of the mediatory role of the United Nations was a Russian device, dating from February 2004.
In 2004, Russian policy in the Cyprus issue was in the process of being reconstituted, and was overtaken by events when arbitration was accepted. Moscow, in co-operation with Papadopoulos and Christofias, succeeded in killing off the prospect of solution as the process developed.
In 2009 Russia, having also the experience of 2004, acted pre-emptively and succeeded in averting the escalation of the procedure, by demonising time-frames and the active role of the international community in advance.
1 Address by former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, to the 9th Regional Conference of Russians living in European countries, Friday, 17th April 2015.
2. Moscow – President Christofias – Russian President – Conference – Cyprus News Agency, by Thomas Kettenis – Moscow 19/11/2008
3. Honorary Doctorate – University of International Relations – CNE, by correspondent Maria Miles – Moscow 20/11/2008.
4. Address by former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, to the 9th Regional Conference of Russians living in European countries, Friday, 17th April 2015.
5. Resolution 63/307, 30 September 2009, «Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia.
6. Voting results published on the Web at http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10853.doc.htm
7. Meeting of Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou with his Russian colleague Sergey Lavrov in Moscow, 09/06/2008.
8. Joint declaration of intent for further deepening of friendly relations and total co-operation between the Republic of Cyprus and the Russian Federation, 20/11/2008.
9. Κyriacos S. Kolovos, “Counterweight”, July 18th 2009.
10. “Pressure on Greek Cypriots cooking”, 10/9/2010.
11. Letter from Cyprus, by Alexander Downer, The Adelaide Review, September 30, 2010.
12. Arrival of President Christofias in New York, Press and Information Office, 22/9/2009.
13. Christofias – Lavrov meeting, CNE, 25/9/2009.
14. President Christofias – military parade, CNE, 1/10/2009
15. “Ban Ki-Moon wants intensive talks now”, Politis, 14/2/2010.
16. “President of the Republic receives Russian Foreign Minister”, Press and Information Office, Communiques, 4/11/2009.
17. “Cypriot – Russian alliance”, Fileleftheros, 5/11/2009
18. Foreign Ministers of Cyprus and Russia – Talks, CNE, 4/11/2009.
19. “Statements by President of the Republic Mr. Demetris Christofias,” Press and Information Office, Communiques, 21/12/2009.
20. “Yesterday’s statements to the Press by the Government Spokesman”, Press and Information Office, Communiques, 11/1/2010.
21. Cyprus issue: D. Christofias’ letters to foreign leaders ΑΠΕ – ΜΠΕ, January 16th 2010.
22. Statements by the Government Spokesman after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 23/2/2010.
23. “Address by President of the Republic Mr. Christofias at the dinner in honour of the Secretary General of the United Nations Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, PIO, Communiques 31/01/2010.
24. UN – UNFICYP – motion agreement, CNE 15/6/2010.
25. CNE 22/06/2010.
26. Russian Foreign Ministry, Markos Kyprianou visit, CNE 20/6/2010
27. Christofias – Medvedev conference, CNE 7/10/2010