Cyprus’ entry into Nato – why yes

By Demetrios H Hadjihambis

Reading the article of Christos Panayiotides ‘Entry of Cyprus into Nato – Why not?’ published recently, I thought it would be a good idea to continue the subject with special emphasis on the historical background and by reference to the rationalist approach which must always rule the political choices of every country aiming at the maximum benefit to its security and external relations.

With the establishment of the modern Greek state, the Greek Cypriots were orientated towards the idea of union with Greece. This orientation was sought with the Eoka struggle on the basis of the unionist referendum. The Eoka struggle did not achieve its aim, ending up with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. It was, nevertheless, taken for granted when it started that union with Greece presupposed with the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece, its automatic membership of Nato. Greece, from every aspect a part of Europe, was already a member as she continues to be, and indeed strengthening to the utmost its ties with the USA for the benefit of its national interests especially as regards its relations with Turkey.

Granted this, the independent policy which the government of newly established Cyprus followed, despite Makarios’ initial declaration that ‘we belong to the western alliance’, constituted a contradiction towards the identification of the interests of Greece and Cyprus. Apart from the fact that both mother countries of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots were members of Nato and guarantor powers, the third guarantor power, the United Kingdom, not only was one of the major members of Nato but also had sovereign bases in the Republic of Cyprus.

The contradiction was accentuated by the fact that the independent policy followed involved relations and activities which caused serious concerns about such an inclination towards the Soviet Union that reflected upon the interests of Greece’s allies – the characterisation of Cyprus as ‘Cuba of the Mediterranean’ says everything. This policy therefore antagonised strong and established interests of the western alliance, placed Greece in a difficult position and exposed Cyprus to unfavorable relations and dangers made even greater by Turkey’s threat against Cyprus after the substantive collapse of the bicommunal operation of the state in 1964. The rejection in the same year by the government of Cyprus of the Acheson plan for union of Cyprus with Greece, which aimed at the definite avoidance of Cyprus’ eastern inclination by its incorporation into Nato through union with Greece, brought Cyprus into an even more difficult position and facilitated the western stand of toleration of the Turkish invasion in 1974. This was especially so since the opposition of the USA to the threatened Turkish invasion in 1967 did not differentiate the policy of Cyprus which continued to antagonise western interests.

We are not here concerned with the unquestionable right of every independent country to follow its own policy as to its foreign relations. What is of concern is the wisdom of any such policy in connection with its consequences, particularly in the case of a small and weak country like Cyprus which is, moreover, burdened by the threat and occupation of its close neighbour Turkey. The teachings of the great Venizelian pragmatic political philosophy are traced to Phocion, that wisest Athenian general and statesman, who advised the Athenians that if they could not win through their own power they should be allies and not rivals with those who had this power. Greece, on the basis of its accession to Nato, followed and follows this philosophy with increased commitment, so as to feel safe. Cyprus, since indeed its interests go hand in hand with those of Greece, has no better choice. To the same direction points the dimension of the European Union, of which Cyprus, like Greece, is a member. The contemporaneous identity of most countries as members of the European Union and Nato is not accidental but rather the certification of the relation between the interests of the two.

The solid substructure for the position in support of the accession of Cyprus to Nato is the identity of the interests of Cyprus and Greece, which is advanced by their common participation in the European Union. In order that the idea of common understanding and common course between Greece and Cyprus may have full meaning, there should be no chasm whatsoever in the area of their wider alliance either. The European Union has, through common membership, furthered Cyprus’ political approach to Greece. The accession of Cyprus to Nato will contribute even more to their strategic community and will render them stronger and safer.

Demetrios H Hadjihambis LLB (hons) Exon, PhD Cantab, LLD (honoris causa) Exon, formerly lecturer-in-law at the University of Exeter and president of the Supreme Court of Cyprus