The Turkey-Libya MoU increasing tensions with Greece
After a quiet year in 2021, perhaps as a result of Covid-19, we are back to the perennial problem of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) disputes in the East Med.
On the positive side, serious progress has been made in resolving the long-standing EEZ border dispute between Lebanon and Israel. This will open the way for Cyprus and Lebanon to finalise their 2007 EEZ-border agreement. In addition, Cyprus and Israel agreed on September 19 a roadmap to resolve their differences on the division of the Aphrodite gasfield reserves.
Sadly, though, maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey have flared up again. This time it involves a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Turkey and Libya, ‘Memorandum of Cooperation on Hydrocarbons’, that appears to be sequel to the 2019 MoU that led to an agreement of maritime ‘borders’ between the two countries.
The new MoU, yet again, risks pushing Greece and Turkey one step closer to conflict. The two came close to a clash in 2020, that resulted in a collision between two of their battleships.
Libya-Turkey developments
The new agreement, reached early October between Turkey and Libya’s interim prime minister, promotes cooperation in the development and utilisation of hydrocarbon resources and allows Turkey to conduct exploration, production, transportation, refining, distribution and trading of hydrocarbons in Libya’s ‘EEZ’, but no details are given, for example when and where.
This appears to be a sequel to the 2019 MoU that defines borders between the EEZs of Turkey and Libya, ignoring the rights of the Greek islands, even Crete. It is based on arguments similar to those used by Turkey to justify its claims around Cyprus. It is not in accordance with the International Convention on the Law of the Sea Unclos. This memorandum and the Turkish claims are not recognised by the EU and the US. But that doesn’t stop Turkey from using it.
These MoUs violate Greek rights and are also in conflict with the Greece-Egypt border agreement between their EEZs, which is based on Unclos and was signed in 2020.
The new MoU escalates the dispute between Greece and Turkey, especially if Turkey proceeds with investigations in areas claimed by Greece, and risks taking us back to the intense conflicts of 2020.
Greece has already warned that “The violation of the Greece-Egypt agreement will not be allowed, nor of its EEZ. She will defend her rights,” and informed France and its allies accordingly.
But what the Libyan foreign minister said is quite interesting: she stated that the relevant memorandum of understanding [of 2019] has not yet been activated, “as the verification procedures by the UN are awaited”. This implies that Libya does not intend to make use of the MoUs until this happens.
Meanwhile, the Libyan parliament announced that it does not recognise this agreement and rejects it, calling it illegal and violating international agreements. Evidently, the Libyan position will not be clear until elections are held, but we do not know when.
In addition, the US State Department has confirmed that “The interim government of Libya is obliged by the Forum for Political Dialogue in Libya (LPDF) not to sign new agreements, which disrupt the country’s external relations or entail long-term obligations,” adding “We call on all parties to refrain from actions that risk increasing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.” The EU, but also Germany and Egypt, have taken similar positions, dismissing these deals as illegal.
However, the new MoU has intensified the rhetoric between Greece and Turkey that has been building up most of this year, as Turkey nears presidential elections mid-2023. With President Erdogan low in all polls so far, he appears to be using threat of aggression against Greece as a means of bolstering his nationalist support. This is not new, but as it intensifies, there is always a risk of a flare-up, especially with President Erdogan threatening to attack Greece. He threatened last week “When the time comes, we can come suddenly one night.”
This prompted foreign minister Nicos Dendias to confirm that Greece will defend its sovereign rights and to warn that allowing Turkey to continue threatening Greece would run the risk of yet another conflict in Europe, referring to the Ukraine war. Greece has warned that “If Turkey tries to send drilling ships south of the island of Crete, it will be very serious for the region.” However, it does not look likely that it will come to that.
In the meanwhile, Turkey has appointed a new ambassador to Greece, Çağatay Erciyes, who is considered its most experienced diplomat in the field of maritime zones, but also of Turkey’s maritime claims in the East Med, including its “Blue Homeland” strategy. This, perhaps, signifies the gravity Turkey is placing on this subject, but it may also point to future dialogue on the subject – perhaps after elections.
Lebanon-Israel
Meanwhile, Lebanon and Israel are getting closer to an agreement to demarcate the borders between their EEZs, brokered by the US. The Karish field, operated by Greece’s Energean, remains in Israel. Another nearby small gas prospect, Qana, will be exploited by Lebanon and Total in whose block this is located.
However, the news on October 6 is that the agreement is facing last-minute challenges. Lebanon requested some amendments that Israel promptly rejected. They may have to do with a provision that Israel will be paid compensation from future Lebanese exploration of the Qana prospect. But Lebanon is still keen to reach agreement, so that it can get some relief out of its economic crisis.
If two countries, technically still at war, can reach such an agreement, it gives hope for all others.
In the meanwhile, Energean is readying to start production from the Karish gasfield “within weeks”, possibly later this month. Israel is guaranteeing its security and has vouched to stop any attempts to interfere with this.
Impact on Cyprus
A Lebanon-Israel agreement also concerns Cyprus because it allows the determination of the point where the Cyprus-Lebanon-Israel EEZs meet and the formalisation of the 2007 agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon to define the borders between their EEZs.
At the same time, it is putting pressure on Cyprus and Israel to reach agreement on sharing Aphrodite’s gas reserves, which still remains unsolved. The news on September 19 that the energy ministers of Cyprus and Israel agreed a roadmap for future negotiations rekindled hopes. Hopefully negotiations will be expedited.
However, the continuing and, at present, deepening disputes between Turkey and Greece, are also affecting Cyprus. The associated geopolitical risk, and the unresolved Cyprus problem, may be thwarting investment in developing Cyprus gasfields. Let’s hope that with elections out of the way, 2023 will bring solutions.
Dr Charles Ellinas, @CharlesEllinas is a senior fellow at the Global Energy Centre of the Atlantic Council
