Our View: Christodoulides’ moves to break Cyprob impasse could irk his hardline backers

In his victory speech on Sunday night, president-elect Nicos Christodoulides said his top concern “is the termination of the Turkish occupation and the reunification of the country,” and vowed to “to do everything to break the deadlock for a resumption of the negotiations, so we can create the conditions for the solution of the Cyprus problem.” This was repeated throughout the week.

On Monday, in a phone call with the Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar, who had called to congratulate him on his election, Christdoulides proposed they met. The ‘social’ meeting was agreed on Thursday and will take place, at the house of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Colin Stewart on February 23, before the president-elect is sworn in. While nothing can be expected from a social meeting, with no agenda, it showed a sense of urgency by Christodoulides, an indication that the Cyprus issue will be a top concern of his presidency.

He did not even agree with the view heard during the election campaign, that we should wait until after the elections in Turkey to try to break the deadlock, because the passing of time was not to the benefit of the Cyprus issue, he said. In another show of this urgency, he said he would consider going to Brussels ahead of the European Council on March 23 “in order to discuss with the Commission our proposal and officially ask for the start of the initiative.”

He was referring to the “need for a more active, leading involvement of the EU, within the framework of the United Nations.” The active involvement of the EU in the peace process was the proposal he repeated during his election campaign as the way forward on the Cyprus issue, although he did not elaborate. He did however repeat his proposal to the High Representative of the Union on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell in a telephone conversation on Wednesday.

How realistic is the more active involvement of the EU in the peace process as a proposal? Could it really break the deadlock, as Christodoulides seems to suggest? First, the Turkish side would have to agree to it. Second, if Turkey does not object, a more active EU involvement could materialise, once the deadlock is broken, not before. The two sides, helped by the UN, would first have to agree a formula for a resumption of talks, before the EU would become involved. Brussels would never take the role of the UN.

It also has to be said that Brussels might approach any request for involvement by Nicosia with a large degree of skepticism, considering the last time it tried to assist the process in 2017, it ended in failure with the EU placing the responsibility for this on President Anastasiades. Having been let down once by the Greek Cypriots, it would require concrete proof of the new president’s commitment to a see a process through to the end. Verbal assurances are unlikely to be enough. Brussels would want to see practical steps taken by Christodoulides and a positive response from the Turkish side, to commit to active, leading involvement.

Any steps taken to break the deadlock by the new president, however, would be attacked by the parties that elected him and will participate in his government. Edek is opposed to bizonal, bicommunal federation, while Diko has slammed the Guterres framework, the point from which talks would resume. Would Christodoulides be prepared to fall out with his government partners within a month of coming to power in his efforts to break the deadlock?

We should not delude ourselves that there could be a resumption of the talks from the current deadlock without our side making some daring moves, which will never be accepted by the parties backing the president. In this context, it is difficult to understand the eagerness of the president-elect to treat the Cyprus problem as a matter of urgency.

It is, but nobody would have criticised him or found him at fault if he took a more measured approach, carried out contacts through the UN, and explored possible ways of persuading the Turkish side to return to the negotiating table. People would not have thought any less of him if these efforts did not lead anywhere as nobody entertains great hopes of a breakthrough. Why is he creating these expectations when the likelihood is that his moves will come to nothing?

Has he overestimated his abilities or is this an attempt to bury the Cyprus problem once and for all by making a big noise about breaking the deadlock, safe in the knowledge that it will not happen? He does have the hardline Tatar opposite him and a Turkish government that has made the two-state solution its declared objective. In these conditions, it seemed unnecessary to create expectations, especially as there was no pressure at all, to do so.