IN THE behind-the-scenes political series The West Wing, Martin Sheen plays a tough but honest American president whose motives, although often publicly perceived as dubious, were always well intentioned.
Reading through some recently published US intelligence transcripts on Cyprus 1974-1976 was somewhat reminiscent of a West Wing script, giving a small glimpse of both the public and private persona of the main players.
Ploughing through more than 800 pages of such text may not sound exactly riveting, but in the context of seeing the characters at play rather than trawling for new historical content, it was an enlightening exercise.
Besides, the papers have already been picked through for historical information and contain nothing that was not already known about the US role during the Cyprus crisis of 1974.
Central to the crisis was then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with appearances by Richard Nixon, his successor Gerald Ford, Glafos Clerides, Archbishop Makarios, Turkish prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan.
Not exactly a pretty cast of characters, but just Googling “Henry Kissinger is the devil” provides enough material to give The West Wing a run for its money in terms of the politics.
Kissinger has often been accused of engineering the invasion, but the transcripts themselves do not prove this one way or the other. The conversations suggest he was unaware, but intelligence reports suggest the State Department was informed. Of course, such officially released transcripts always consist only of what the CIA allows to be published.
The scene starts July 17, 1974 with an intelligence briefing concluding that Turkey would not act militarily in the wake of the July 15 coup, but if they did, they would probably never leave.
“Our first objective is to avoid a Greek-Turkish war and Soviet intervention,” said Kissinger.
This was followed by instructions to try and prevent Turkish intervention and failing that, to secure guarantees that Greek and Turkish soldiers would not fire on each other during the military operation.
“If the Turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have
to work for double enosis and give the Greeks the other part of the island,” Kissinger says in another briefing on July 19. “But what do you think they’re after? They’re not after the whole island are they?” he asks later.
Irrespective of who knew what, it is clear all the way through that US officials had absolutely no interest in what was going on in Cyprus, other than how it related to their own, and NATO’s interests.
The only person who asked about casualties was Richard Nixon on July 20 in a conversation with Kissinger, but in general, Cyprus was perceived as merely a thorn in the side of US and NATO.
One memo states: “The US does not have fundamental objectives as regards Cyprus itself except in the context of Cyprus’ effect on other US interests.”
Or in the words of US President Gerald Ford on July 29, 1976 in a meeting with Ecevit: “Cyprus is a cancer which is harmful to this administration or to any US administration.”
“Ecevit: If negotiations on Cyprus and the Aegean were simultaneous, one move would bring another.
Kissinger: Never have I seen so many negotiations begun with talk about the right atmosphere and then fail.
Kissinger: I will now go to [Greek Foreign Minister] Bitsios and see him alone. I’ll come back to see you then and then I will see my psychiatrist! You guys have so complicated the Cyprus problem that no one can understand it and now you’re doing it to the Aegean.”
A month earlier, Kissinger had said both the Greeks and Turks were “beyond his comprehension”, and in early 1975: “I think there’s something undignified about the United States pleading with all these maniacs to be reasonable when we have absolutely nothing to gain from it.
“We go around crying all over the place, saying: ‘Please be reasonable.’
They’ve been unreasonable all along. We’re not going to plead with anybody any more. We’re going to say, ‘You’ve made this mess. See what happens?’
Back on July 22, 1974, Kissinger also thought the Turks had been “incompetent” because they didn’t even manage to take Nicosia airport. The British government apparently though the same.
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British Ambassador to the US said: “I was concerned about the Turkish performance in Cyprus because they did not appear able to handle modern weapons well, and I think this has unhappy implications for NATO’s southern flank. They even failed to take Nicosia Airport.”
Yet it was clear from the papers that all moves that were made were only to pacify Turkey. Prior to the second wave of the invasion on August 14, 1974, Kissinger said that although the US did not want a Greco-Turkish war, that “if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us”. “There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus,” he added.
The oddest conversation, however, took place between Kissinger and British Foreign Secretary Callaghan on July 22.
“Kissinger: And I’ve really enjoyed working with you on this.
Callaghan: I really have. I think we’ve managed this not too badly, don’t you?
Kissinger: I think it’s come out as a net asset.
Callaghan: Yes, I think it’s good too. We’ve got to get rid of this fellow
Sampson [the coup President] quickly, you know? And you must be absolutely filthy to Sampson.
Kissinger: You can count on that too. (laughter)
Callaghan: Very good. I can always count on you being filthy, can I?
Kissinger: We really have turned nasty on this.”
In analysing the 1974 situation, a study prepared by the Intelligence Community concluded the only occasion when there appeared to have been an inconsistency between intelligence and policy action was with respect to the Turkish invasion. “The intelligence warning of that event appears to have been explicit, but the State Department apparently did not act on it.”
According to the report, the explicit warning was received, including the date of the invasion. “State Department takes little if any preventative action. Claims it did not get the message,” the report adds.
