Leontios Ierodiakonou in his latest instalment on the history of the Cyprus problem lists the blunders made by our first two presidents
After the Turkish invasion, when the Turks’ position became unassailable, and ours extremely weakened, our behaviour in terms of decision-making on the Cyprus problem continued to be in the hands of one person: the president of the day.
Unfortunately, some of the presidents either were:
a) by mistaken or superficial initiatives
b) out of fear of responsibility and timidity
c) to protect their political careers
d) out of fear of harming their popularity
e) for personal and self-serving reasons incapable of taking difficult but nationally responsible and necessary decisions.
These weaknesses prevent sincere and coherent dialogue. Instead, they push political leaders to set pleasant-sounding targets, knowing that (with the means at our disposal) they are unattainable. Unattainable targets clearly serve Turkey’s interests. They lead to a continuous stalemate which, over time, allows the occupying force to consolidate the illegal fait accompli of the invasion unhindered. We all know that the long and fruitless passing of time creates new rights.
No matter how just our goals may be, when they are not achievable they cause harm instead of benefits. We must at least learn from our own mistakes. We should reflect on how much better off we would be if, since the late 1940s, we had been more down to earth, more compromising, less romantic and especially more informed. Let us consider how many serious mistakes we have committed between then and now.
Certainly, the fact that the Cyprus problem has not been solved, since the invasion, is mainly because of the intransigence of the occupier, which is both expected and given. But to barricade ourselves behind this given and completely absolve ourselves is mere submission to fate.
As often, the argument is made that all the Cyprus presidents wanted, and worked in good faith, to solve the problem and failed – therefore none of them is to blame for the failure to reach a settlement – I would like to cite a few examples that challenge this.
One example dates from before the Turkish invasion. Despite the strong disagreement of the government in Athens, Makarios in 1963 proceeded to revise the constitution with the notorious 13 points. The result was the outbreak of the clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Four years later, after the withdrawal of the Greek army division from Cyprus, in January 1968, Makarios abandoned the policy of the ‘desirable’, which was Enosis, and adopted the policy of the ‘attainable’, which was the revision of the constitution.
A few months later, talks began between Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash for a revision of the constitution. During 1971 and 1972, the Turkish Cypriots accepted all 13 points proposed by Makarios in 1963, which they had rejected nine years earlier. In other words, the goal of the ‘attainable’ was realised. Clerides, in a meeting with Makarios on September 12, 1972, persistently sought authorisation to seal the agreement and close the Cyprus problem. (Glafcos Clerides, My Deposition, vol. 3, pp. 203-204).
And the prime minister of the then military government in Athens Georgios Papadopoulos went so far as to send a personal letter to Makarios, in very stern language, (which even contained threats since it came to be known as “Papadopoulos’ bitter words”) asking him to reconsider his decision to reject the agreement reached. Makarios was adamant. Could this behaviour of Makarios be regarded conducive to a solution?
After the invasion, in 1978 the Anglo-American-Canadian plan (in retrospect, considered to be perhaps the best) was proposed to us; it envisaged the withdrawal of occupying troops and territorial adjustments. At the start of the talks, it stipulated the return of all the inhabitants of Famagusta to their homes and properties where they would stay regardless of the outcome of the talks.
It should be stressed here, that just four years after the invasion, houses, roads, water and electricity supply systems were in perfect working order. At that time, there were no Turkish settlers and no difficult established facts.
Do those, who lump all presidents together, know that the then president, Spyros Kyprianou, after rejecting this plan told his foreign minister, Nicos Rolandis, “Nico, why don’t you call the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in New York and suggest to him to re-submit the Plan, not as an Anglo-American-Canadian Plan, but as a United Nations Plan?” (N. Rolandis, Glances at Life and History, pp. 73-75.)
Could this behaviour be regarded conducive to a solution?
In 1983, at the behest of Kyprianou, Rolandis asked the then UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to prepare and propose a plan for a settlement of the Cyprus problem.
When de Cuellar presented his plan, known as the ‘Cuellar Indicators’, Rolandis was very pleased with its content. Disy and Akel also took a positive stance, but the president eventually rejected it, thus prompting Rolandis’ resignation. Could this behaviour be regarded conducive to a solution?
The following year, after four months of negotiations between the two sides, on December 12, 1984, de Cuellar found that the two sides had moved significantly closer, something that could lead to a final agreement. He even announced that the two parties had agreed to hold a joint high-level meeting “under my auspices on 17 January 1985” in New York for finalisation and signatures. At that time there had been Akel-Diko cooperation on the basis of the so-called ‘minimum programme’. This was why President Kyprianou telephoned the then general secretary of Akel, Ezekias Papaioannou and assured him that “we have concluded it and it is the best we could get.” Papaioannou “congratulated the President for this successful development”. (House of Representatives minutes, 21 February 1985, p. 962).
On January 17 in New York Kyprianou effectively asked to renegotiate the plan, while Denktash appeared ready to sign. Thus, Kyprianou rejected the plan which he had praised a month earlier without explaining what it was that changed his attitude. Was this behaviour conducive to reaching a settlement?
The following year, on March 29, 1986, de Cuellar presented a new plan. Because of the disagreements expressed in the Greek Cypriot community, a meeting was held in Athens, at which the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was present. It was attended by leaders or representatives of all the Cyprus parties. At that meeting – mainly on the initiative of Kyprianou – the notorious “preamble” was agreed, which was presented by the Kyprianou as a unanimous decision. Disy and Akel denied it.
After the “preamble”, which in effect set conditions for talks, Kyprianou adopted more ‘aggressive’ diplomacy. In a letter to the UN secretary-general, “he called for the convening of an international conference on the international aspects of the Cyprus problem, namely: a) withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops and settlers and b) effective international guarantees”. Was there even the remotest possibility of these dreams being realised?
As far as the new UN plan was concerned, once again Disy and Akel took a positive stand. Kyprianou’s position was that this was “neither accepted nor rejected” (M, Christodoulou, Cyprus – Greece, Volume 2, pp. 294-295). Was this behaviour conducive to reaching a settlement?
Leontios Ierodiakonou is a former Disy deputy who also served as minister of communications in the Clerides government. He is author of books on the Cyprus problem, including Fatal Leadership (1948-2021): Makarios and his Continuers
