Leontios Ierodiakonou in his latest instalment on the history of the Cyprus problem analyses the disastrous response to the Annan plan
In November 2002 the Annan peace plan appeared and was linked with Cyprus’ accession to the EU. At that time Glafcos Clerides was president, but three months later, presidential elections were held, and Tassos Papadopoulos was elected.
On November 7, 2003, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash made it clear that he radically disagreed with the plan and listed a number of reasons why he would reject it. President Papadopoulos, certain that Denktash would go to the talks to reject the plan, sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 17 December asking for “immediate resumption of negotiations” for a Cyprus solution “within the parameters of your plan”.
Suddenly everything changed. After Ankara’s intervention, Denktash, who was the “president” of the regime in the north, announced on March 18, 2004 that he would not attend the forthcoming talks that were to be held in Switzerland. He then sent a letter to the UNSG informing him that the Turkish Cypriot community would be represented by ‘prime minister’ Mehmet Ali Talat and ‘foreign minister’ Serdar Denktash.
This move did not please Papadopoulos. His statements showed that he wanted to negotiate with Denktash, because “the invitation of the secretary-general is addressed to the leaders of the two communities and ‘leader’ means one elected by the people, not appointed by anyone else”. In another statement he made it clear that the UN “has invited the leaders – not their proxies – to the talks to be ready there and then to take binding decisions” (CNA, March 19, 2004).
Papadopoulos did not go to the talks in Switzerland to negotiate and try to improve some provisions of the plan. On the contrary, on his own initiative, he had a series of secret meetings with Serdar Denktash at which unthinkable and naive proposals were made by him, to frustrate the Annan plan.
His first proposal to Serdar was that both sides should reject the plan at the same time. He then asked Serdar to sound out Talat about this, but being in favour of the solution Talat was negative. Then, Papadopoulos assured Serdar – so he could inform Talat – that “this plan will not pass… I know my people”. To convince Talat, he assured Serdar that Akel would also vote ‘no’ in the referendum.
Such was Papadopoulos’ single-minded insistence on rejecting the plan that he did not allow himself to consider that Turkish Cypriots voting in favour and Greek Cypriots against would fully serve Ankara’s interest. Serdar was briefing the Turkish delegation in Switzerland, headed by Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister at the time.
This was followed by Papadopoulos’ televised address to the people on April 7 in which he urged them to reject the plan. Instead of presenting the main points of the plan’s content in a balanced way as president, he only highlighted the negative points in an emotional delivery. When he referred to issues which were likely to be heard as positive by Greek Cypriots, he presented them in a negative way as well. At one point in his speech, he declared, that “even in the provisions that have been improved, we find functional difficulties, complicated procedures and dangerous ambiguities.”
In addition to this distorted briefing, the state machinery was mobilised against the plan. A climate was cultivated that created uncertainty, suggesting that implementation of the plan would adversely affect many professions and business activities in both the private and, above all, the public sector. At the same time, sometimes openly and sometimes in whispers, political figures who were in favour of the ‘yes’ vote were vilified, and their reputation tarnished.
Apart from the rejection of the plan, it should be underlined that our scheming and duplicitous behaviour completely wrecked our credibility which was already badly damaged by Makarios and his successor Spyros Kyprianou. The bitterness expressed by Gunther Verheugen – the European Commissioner for Enlargement, who had warmly supported Cyprus’ accession to the EU – reflected the depressing image of Cyprus in Brussels circles.
At the European Parliament Verheugen said: “I personally feel that I have been deceived by the government of the Republic.” Referring to Papadopoulos’ behaviour he added: “While he used to say that he agreed with the general principles of the plan and that he was only seeking a few improvements, he is now recommending its rejection.”
Since April 2004, we have effectively wounded much more seriously and permanently the only weapon we have – internationalisation. This two-faced political behaviour has badly shaken the confidence of many friends of Cyprus in both the UN and the EU as well as other powerful states that had helped us join the EU and the effort to reunify our homeland. And when it was suggested that rejection of the plan was a serious blow to his credibility at the EU, Papadopoulos’ ‘smart’ response was: “What, will the waiters in Brussels not serve me?” It was with such ease and cynicism, he overcame the consequences of shattering of our credibility.
Could this behaviour ever be considered conducive to a solution?
It is not by chance that the importance of our shattered credibility is underlined here.
After the Turkish invasion, the main – if not the only – weapon available to Cyprus was internationalisation. The setting of utopian goals, however, eliminates any positive role the international community could play in efforts to find a settlement. Internationalisation can help to a certain extent: it necessarily leads to a compromise solution. It cannot provide the complete realisation of our desired goals.
Finally, we must admit that internationalisation has at times offered us plans and proposals that we could have taken advantage of. For example, the Annan plan provided for the return, under Greek Cypriot administration, of territory that would have allowed the return, within a reasonable timeframe, of close to two thirds of refugees to their homes and properties. At the same time, it offered the prospect of return under Turkish Cypriot administration. The plan stipulated the gradual withdrawal of the occupying troops. If such compromises were accepted and implemented, they would open wider horizons and encourage further integration of the economy, culture, population and even territory.
Unfortunately, with the rhetoric of patriotic excess and with nice-sounding slogans such as “immediate withdrawal of all occupying troops, immediate return of all refugees to their homes and properties, and repositioning of the problem as an issue of invasion, occupation and liberation”, after five decades, not a single refugee has returned, not a single square metre of territory has been returned and not a single Turkish soldier has withdrawn.
It is very easy to utter hollow slogans. But they do not lead to responsible and productive political behaviour. On the contrary, they facilitate the gradual consolidation of the occupier’s illegal plans. Our behaviour must be compatible with the means at our disposal.
With peaceful talks and internationalisation, we cannot attain objectives that can only be achieved by military superiority or by victorious war, however clever our interlocutors and diplomats might be.
Leontios Ierodiakonou is a former Disy deputy who also served as minister of communications in the Clerides government. He is author of books on the Cyprus problem, including Fatal Leadership (1948-2021): Makarios and his Continuers
