The head of Britain’s fiscal watchdog resigned on Monday after the agency last week inadvertently released key details of the government’s annual tax and spending budget before finance minister Rachel Reeves announced them in parliament.

The resignation of Richard Hughes came shortly after the Office for Budget Responsibility said in a report that the lapse on November 26 appeared to have occurred with a similar fiscal report earlier this year.

Reuters, which was the first media organisation to publish details of the OBR’s report last week, also published details of its March budget update report when it became publicly accessible online ahead of its official publication time, while Reeves was still making her speech to parliament.

Last week’s early release of the details of £26 billion ($34 billion) worth of tax increases alongside the OBR’s economic forecasts led to mockery and anger among some lawmakers.

Reeves began her budget speech by calling the lapse “deeply disappointing” and a serious error on the part of the OBR.

Hughes said in his resignation letter that he took responsibility for the shortcomings identified in the investigation.

“I have, therefore, decided it is in the best interest of the OBR for me to resign as its chair,” he said in a letter to Reeves.

Hughes began his first five-year term as chair of the independent public body in 2020 before Reeves backed him for a second term in May. His departure follows a period of strained relations between Reeves and the OBR.

Reeves denied on Sunday she had misled the public about the state of Britain’s public finances in the run-up to the budget after the OBR published details of when it told her that its fiscal forecasts were not as bad as some feared.

FAILINGS OF TECH AND LEADERSHIP

The OBR said earlier on Monday that its inadvertent early publication of its assessment of Reeves’ budget last week was due to pre-existing IT failings that had not been spotted by the agency’s leadership.

The inquiry into the causes of the early release had found the weakness was likely to have pre-dated the budget and the OBR said it would improve its systems to prevent a recurrence.

The value of the pound and British government bond prices rose following the Reuters alerts last week.

The OBR report said: “We note however that those who secured early premature access did, at least, disseminate it quickly and widely, through the use of such mechanisms as Reuters alerts, rather than keep it for their private advantage.”

Last week and in March, the links to the reports were not advertised on the OBR’s website.

However, the OBR has used the same web address, or URL, for previous budget documents, changing only the date. Both in March and last week it was uploaded to the OBR website and available to download on an unprotected link.

In March, a Reuters reporter saw the report while Reeves was delivering her half-yearly budget update.

The reports are meant to be published by the OBR only after the finance minister’s speeches are finished.

In March, Reuters sent news alerts, citing the OBR, on the economic outlook, about 25 minutes before Reeves’s speech had finished.

The OBR and the Treasury did not respond to a request for comment on the early publication of the March report and Reuters’ reporting of it.

Last week, the OBR made its Economic and Fiscal Outlook report accessible on its website just under an hour before Reeves started to deliver her budget in parliament at around 12.30pm GMT.

The Reuters reporter, who was preparing to cover the budget, checked the publicly accessible URL shortly after 11.30am GMT.

“We are in no doubt that this failure to protect information prior to publication has inflicted heavy damage on the OBR’s reputation,” two of its non-executive directors said in a foreword to Monday’s publication of the investigation’s results.

“It is the worst failure in the 15-year history of the OBR,” they said.

The OBR’s investigation found 32 unique IP addresses tried to access the report between 11.35pm GMT and 12.07pm GMT.

The OBR, which apologised on the day for the mistake, appointed Ciaran Martin, a former head of the National Cyber Security Centre, to investigate what had gone wrong.

The findings published on Monday said all those involved in producing the EFO believed the necessary protections were in place, but they were not. “The outcome was that the protections did not work,” it said.

“The ultimate responsibility for the circumstances in which this vulnerability occurred and was then exposed rests, over the years, with the leadership of the OBR,” said the non-executive directors.

Martin described the OBR’s publishing process as a “well-planned but significantly underpowered operation”.

The non-executive directors said responsibility for addressing that lay with the OBR’s leadership, but also with the Treasury and the Cabinet Office.