Israel, Turkey, Cyprus: as the regional landscape shifts, states are responding according to their own strategic priorities

The sharp exchanges between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Benjamin Netanyahu are real. The language is harsh. At times, extreme.

It is tempting to dismiss them as political posturing aimed at domestic audiences.

It is equally tempting to see them as a prelude to war.

Both interpretations miss the point.

This is not theatre. Nor is it war.

It is something more consequential: a reconfiguration of power centred on control of space, energy routes, trade corridors and strategic connectivity stretching from Europe to Asia through the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

For decades, the Middle East was shaped by a succession of defining issues and strategic fault lines: the Palestinian question; Israel’s relations with its neighbours; the wars in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria; the upheavals of the Arab Spring; the expanding influence of the Iran-led axis; and later the normalisation dynamic associated with the Abraham Accords.

That framework is now shifting.

The recent US-Israel-Iran war did not create a new Middle East. But it accelerated changes already underway. It exposed the fragility of old assumptions. It highlighted the importance of strategic corridors and partnerships. It pushed regional actors to rethink their place in an evolving geopolitical order.

Gaza and the West Bank cannot be bypassed morally or politically. But they no longer define the region’s geopolitical order on their own.

The deeper contest is unfolding elsewhere: above all in Syria, but also across Lebanon and Iraq, where fragmented state authority allows regional and external actors to compete for influence. It is also unfolding across the trade, energy and connectivity corridors linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

Corridors are no longer merely routes of commerce. They are becoming part of the battlefield.

As the regional landscape shifts, states are responding according to their own strategic priorities. All invoke security. The harder question is how they pursue it – and how others interpret that pursuit. In geopolitics, perceptions shape behaviour. They can also be used to legitimise policies rooted in longer-term strategic ambitions.

Israel seeks security through military superiority, pre-emption, strategic depth and an expanding network of partnerships. In so doing, it inevitably shapes the security calculations of neighbouring states and non-state actors alike. The majority in the international community view aspects of these policies as contributing to instability, humanitarian suffering and violations of international law.

Turkey seeks to project power through military presence, unilateral maritime claims, control of strategic space stretching from northern Syria and Iraq to the Eastern Mediterranean. In doing so, it shapes the strategic calculations of neighbouring states and influences perceptions of its longer-term intentions. 

The continuing occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus by Nato member Turkey provides strategic depth, maritime leverage and forward positioning within that wider geography. Infrastructure projects and other policies linking the occupied north ever more closely to the Turkish mainland reinforce the conclusion that the strategic importance Turkey attaches to Cyprus remains the principal driver of policy, with the pursuit of a negotiated settlement becoming a subterfuge to that objective.

The United States seeks to preserve access, connectivity and freedom of manoeuvre through a combination of military power, structured partnerships and regional frameworks.

Europe seeks stability through interdependence, resilient supply chains, secure connectivity and diversified energy routes.

Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states have related, though not identical, priorities: stability, economic development, secure trade routes and the avoidance of wider regional conflict.

Each of these approaches has its own internal logic.

The challenge is that they operate within the same geography, where their policies increasingly collide.

The security dilemma is at work.

The pursuit of greater security by one actor often generates greater insecurity for another. Measures taken for protection are interpreted as preparation. Defensive actions acquire offensive meaning. Partnerships generate counter-partnerships. Deterrence generates counter-deterrence.

The result is a widening perception gap – one that can become self-fulfilling.

This does not necessarily lead to war.

But it does produce a region increasingly organised around competing strategic visions rather than shared assumptions.

Turkey’s reading of recent regional developments illustrates the point.

Ankara interprets the growing cooperation between Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the United States as part of an emerging regional security architecture that narrows its room for manoeuvre.

Particular attention is focused on the 3+1 framework – the partnership linking Israel, Greece and Cyprus with the United States – which has evolved from diplomatic dialogue into a broader platform for cooperation on energy, maritime security, infrastructure, connectivity and regional stability. Turkey sees much of the same reality as an emerging structure of containment.

Regardless of how Ankara interprets these developments, Cyprus has assumed greater strategic importance within the emerging regional security landscape. Cyprus can serve as a logistical bridge, humanitarian hub, diplomatic platform, intelligence point and energy connector.

Its growing defence cooperation with the United States, France and other Western partners, reflects a broader transformation. Cyprus is increasingly viewed as a security enabler – a predictable, dependable and credible partner in an increasingly volatile region.

For Nicosia, cooperation with Greece, Israel, the United States and other Western partners is practical and interest-driven: security, maritime stability, energy, technology, connectivity and regional resilience.

Israel, meanwhile, increasingly sees Turkey as a long-term strategic challenger as well as a potential security threat.

In recent months, the phrase “Turkey is the new Iran” has appeared with growing frequency in parts of Israel’s political, security and strategic discourse and among some commentators in the United States.

The comparison is excessive. Yet the phrase is revealing. It points to an emerging shift in strategic thinking: Ankara is increasingly viewed as a systemic competitor whose regional objectives may collide with those of Israel and other regional actors.

Ankara rejects that characterisation. Turkish officials portray Israel and its regional partners as destabilising actors pursuing exclusionary agendas and employing mechanisms that, in Ankara’s view, are designed to constrain its influence.

Competing policies are increasingly accompanied by competing narratives.

Beneath the language of connectivity lies another reality: a growing clash between status-quo and revisionist conceptions of regional order.

When such logics collide in the same geography, friction becomes inevitable.

A direct Turkish-Israeli war remains unlikely. Geography, Nato, economic ties and US leverage all constrain escalation.

But rivalry does not require war.

It requires overlapping ambitions, incompatible maps and hardening perceptions.

The Eastern Mediterranean has never been merely a peripheral basin between Europe and the Middle East.

Today, however, it has become an integral part of a wider strategic theatre linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Increasingly, it is through this space that trade routes, energy corridors, digital connectivity and geopolitical influence intersect.

Cyprus is assuming a more prominent role within the emerging strategic architecture. That increases both its relevance and its exposure to regional risks.

The challenge is to convert geography into strategy.

It requires:

• A strong economy;

• national preparedness: air, maritime, cyber, energy and infrastructure security;

• a strong strategic partnership with like-minded states while retaining the capacity to act in accordance with Cyprus’ own interests.

• deeper institutionalised security ties with the United States, including designation as a Major Non-Nato Ally, deserve serious consideration, as I have argued previously in: “NATO, Cyprus and the Final Leap” and “From Embargoes to Strategic Partnerships”; and

• legal firmness. Cyprus must never allow others to redefine it as a platform, proxy or appendage. It is a sovereign state, partially occupied, acting within international law.

Cyprus’ choices must therefore be understood within a wider regional context. The changes underway are not episodic. They are structural.

The deeper transformation now underway extends well beyond the rhetoric exchanged between Ankara and Jerusalem.

The contest is no longer only about who threatens whom. It is about who shapes corridors, routes, infrastructure and strategic space across a changing region.

Israel and Turkey are central to that contest.

The United States is helping structure it.

Europe is increasingly becoming part of it.

Cyprus sits at its intersection.

Geography creates strategic relevance.

Strategy determines whether that relevance becomes an asset or a liability.