I would like to correct one important point in your recent column on the Cyprus negotiations (‘Tales from the Coffee Shop’, Patroclos, Sunday Mail, July 26).

I served as Turkish Cypriot chief negotiator from April 2005 until November 2007.

This was the period immediately following the failure of the Annan Plan. The previous negotiating framework had effectively collapsed and had to be rebuilt from scratch.

During this period, the two leaders, Mehmet Ali Talat and Tassos Papadopoulos, met only two or three times. As a result, the chief negotiators played a far more central role than is normally the case, meeting regularly – often two or three times a week – to prepare the ground for decisions by the leaders.

Your article suggests that our many meetings “never arrived anywhere”. That assertion is unfortunately mistaken.

We established the basis for the launch of full-fledged negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and completed a comprehensive package of confidence-building measures. We also made substantial progress towards opening the Ledra street crossing.

The negotiating framework and the confidence-building package laid the foundations for the process that continued over the following decade and eventually culminated at Crans-Montana in 2017.

During those two and a half years, much of this work was carried out deliberately away from the public eye because both sides understood that serious negotiations required discretion rather than headlines.

Because this work remained largely invisible, other political actors frequently received credit for initiatives whose essential groundwork had already been laid during this time.

It is worth recalling that this was a period when the two community leaders scarcely met. Yet, despite those difficult circumstances, significant progress was achieved.

None of it happened by accident. It was the product of patient, painstaking work by both negotiating teams, supported by the then United Nations special representative of Michael Møller. The professionalism, patience, perseverance and mutual respect displayed by both negotiating teams were indispensable. Without them none of these achievements would have been possible. Møller’s quiet diplomacy, persistence and judgement also helped create the atmosphere of confidence that made genuine progress possible.

The texts for the launch of the full-fledged negotiations and the implementation of the confidence-building package were fully negotiated, agreed by both sides and ready to be implemented.

Implementation of both packages was subsequently deferred, not because the negotiators had failed to produce results, but because political considerations intervened ahead of the Greek Cypriot presidential elections.

It was considered preferable to await the outcome of those elections rather than provide Papadopoulos, who had not been forthcoming in the peace process, with an additional political advantage during his campaign.

It is therefore incorrect to suggest that the comprehensive work undertaken by the negotiators was intended to “arrive nowhere”. The record shows that it produced concrete results and established the foundations upon which all subsequent negotiations, including Crans-Montana, were built.

I hope that this contribution helps place that period in its proper historical context.

Rasit Pertev, former Turkish Cypriot chief negotiator (April 2005 – November 2007)