Pity the nation that relies on unenforced UN resolutions as it pleads its case.
By Kerry Abbott
The UN counts on a rules-based order, bereft of most means of enforcement. In Cyprus there are good offices, a peacekeeping force and numerous peace efforts by perhaps the only outside party still focused on reuniting the island in a bizonal, bicommunal federal system. It does not develop ingenious ways to resolve conflicts, or practise functional conflict resolution, but relies on negotiations, usually led by diplomats formed in the national systems of small countries not involved in international disputes. That assumes a certain standard approach to conflict resolution that follows similar lines instead of focusing on the uniqueness of the context and cultures.
The divided island of Cyprus has much in common with other countries in conflict: occupation forces, UN mission, a level of normalcy that makes a return to open warfare undesirable. It has been the test ground of every Western social theorist over the past 40 years, from Leonard Doob to the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, through the conflict resolution workshop to Aikido and transformative scenario planning. And, of course, the obligatory study visit to Northern Ireland.
Every unproven idea came to Cyprus as a test lab. Contact hypothesis, which suggests that if you only meet with other and see the shared humanity, the conflict is resolved, is naive North American thinking, not even proven in that fragmented setting. It has spawned a new phase, of people-to-people groups, often comprised of women or youth, which the UN likes to involve to demonstrate inclusivity regardless of immediate relevance. Although people meet each other, they lack the ability to resolve the greater issues, as was demonstrated with its failure in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
In the absence of strategic analysis of interests and targeted solutions, the reliance is on confidence building, or small concessions that show goodwill –such as the opening of new crossing points. Invariably, success is measured in those limited steps, and expectations are lowered, as though the broader issues are insurmountable.
Along the same lines, the EU engages in development efforts that presume the island will be reunified, not divided into two countries. As soon as the Turkish Cypriots deviated from the agreed plan and called for separation, should EU investments have continued? Does improving life in what would be an outlier province of Turkey facilitate the reunification of Cyprus?
Making the status quo more comfortable, and offering material progress without political concessions, does not suggest a coherent approach. Indeed, a spokesman of the EU recently said that “The opening of crossing points enables both communities to meet and trade, fostering trust and paving the way for the eventual reunification of Cyprus,” What is the theory of change behind that statement, the causal link?
One might suggest the EU is improving the other side – levelling up – so there is no need for reunification. There is no common UN-EU effort to engage in functional conflict resolution and more considered methods of engagement across multiple nodes of invested groups to reveal that common ground is made through effort, not merely observed to exist.
The Turkish Cypriot leader says they have backed the bizonal federation formula for decades, to no avail. Now is the time to move on. But a greater division will not work better, and alliances have changed in the interim. As Cyprus leaves behind the ties with Russia that scuttled any agreement at Crans-Montana, in favour of Nato membership, and as northern Cyprus claims only a two-state solution will be acceptable, the reality on the ground is changing.
Cyprus is strengthening its ties with the Western regional agenda. If Turkish Cypriots end up as a marginal province of Turkey, Cyprus would be not only physically divided but spanning two different regional spheres of influence and opposing sides of conflicts.
And given the changing demography of the north, where the official population is estimated to be twice as high as stated, due to an influx of immigrants who are entitled to ‘TRNC’ and then Turkish citizenship, how would that alter any referendum or further diminish the weight of the original Turkish Cypriot population? Will all Cypriots align against outsiders who dilute their shared identity? Or, will new arrivals prefer to be part of Europe and support a federal solution, thus negating the current strategy of the ‘TRNC’?
These are questions to be examined and addressed in a broader strategy for dealing with current divisions, which have evolved over time – the original trauma of mistreatment, invasion and occupation, the threats to minority rights, the chauvinism and fears of inferiority. When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Greek Cypriots “spoiled” last summer during the anniversary of the Turkish invasions, he was revealing the underlying resentment many outsiders express of the West. These suppressed grudges bear the sour taste that prevents people on both sides from swallowing a proposal.
There will always be a solution for Cyprus but why lose more time and gamble on an uncertain life that could become more complex? Recent changes in Lebanon that removed the oppressive yoke of an authoritarian militia, and the ensuing collapse of the Syrian regime, demonstrate how quickly the landscape evolves. Interests are realigning and, with a measure of enlightened action, Cyprus can be part of the new equation.
Kerry Abbott is a development strategist working with a dozen international agencies to evaluate the impact of interventions in more than 20 conflict regions, including Cyprus
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