Two-state policy in Cyprus is not an opening gambit but the end game

But it would never work because the RoC would have to relinquish sovereignty over areas not under its effective control, which is just not going to happen – not now, not ever

I confess I have been unable to write about the crisis in Gaza because my freedom of expression is hampered by too much self-editing that converts the flow of words and ideas into meaningless weasel words.

Too much self-editing is bad for creative writing. It makes one sound lukewarm like the BBC: on the one hand this and on the other hand that; you delete and rearrange and start again, until eventually you give up.

‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’: so wrote the philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. He did not have in mind the problem of self-editing, but his aphorism provides a justification of sorts. He was suggesting I should not be talking at all if I do not know what I am talking about, but his saying also holds good when you have to self-edit so much that what you write is meaningless gibberish.

I don’t have the problem of excessive self-editing when writing about the Cyprob. Perhaps I would have the problem if I were writing in the heat of events in the summer of 1974, when feelings were raw, and people were suffering in real time.

Talking about the Cyprob, I have always been puzzled how the two-state solution adopted by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots after the debacle at Crans-Montana in 2017, marries-up with the legal fact that membership of the EU is of a single Cypriot state.

For that reason I thought it was a tactical rather than a substantive position, borne of a belief in Turkish Cypriot circles that the RoC lacks incentive to change the status quo. The idea being that the RoC would wish to change the status quo if it were negotiating for a federal solution with a sovereign Turkish Cypriot state.

It was the late Dr Christian Heinze, who served as deputy to the president of the Cyprus Constitutional Court Dr Ernst Forthstoff 1962-63, who suggested the adoption of the two-state model whether the Turkish side was pursuing a federal solution or not.

He had argued in a debate a couple of years ago, in which I took part, that the Cyprob could be solved more easily by the acceptance of a Turkish Cypriot state. This was because a federal union, he said, involves two sovereign states joining up under a federal umbrella to mutual advantage, rather than disengaging from a de jure unitary state that does not exist in fact.

My problem with a Turkish Cypriot state as a starting point is that the RoC would find it impossible to accept a position whereby the Turkish Cypriot side would then itself have no incentive to reach a comprehensive settlement.

Alas, the problem does not arise because I have since been told authoritatively, though off the record, that the two-state policy is not an opening gambit but the end game.

What I also did not know is that the Turkish Cypriot two-state policy acknowledges that any separate Turkish Cypriot state will have to reapply to join the EU as a free-standing entity. And further that it would only join if and when Turkey joins, which for all practical purposes means not at all.

This has not always been made explicit to Turkish Cypriots or indeed to Greek Cypriots. Perhaps it was fudged as it was politically inconvenient, or because it was not fully understood that two states is legally impossible because it requires treaty change of Protocol 10 of the treaty of accession of Cyprus.

So far as EU law is concerned the whole island of Cyprus joined the EU, although the application of its legal order (the acquis) was suspended in areas not under the effective of the government of RoC. In its preamble Protocol 10 envisages a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprob in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions that call for a bicommunal bizonal federal (BBF) settlement.

So, a two-state solution would require all the member states of the EU to let the Turkish Cypriots exit the EU like Greenland did in 1985, after it gained autonomy from Denmark. Unless, of course, the RoC were to relinquish its sovereignty over areas not under its effective control, which is just not going to happen – not now, not ever.

I was also told that the reason why the Turkish Cypriot side is opposed the appointment of a UN special envoy, was that his or her remit would be governed by the same resolutions that call for BBF, for which the Turkish side no longer wishes to negotiate. They are, however, agreeable to the appointment of the UN secretary-general’s personal envoy with no BBF strings attached to keep the UN secretary-general informed of Turkish Cypriot thinking.

As for Turkish Cypriots retaining Republic of Cyprus and EU citizenship, I was told that as dual citizenship is permitted by RoC they would not lose their citizenship of the EU.

However, if the Turkish Cypriots were to acquire a recognised Turkish Cypriot citizenship, it would be lawful under international law for RoC to deprive them of their RoC and EU citizenship.

Many Brits regretted leaving the EU but at least they did so after a referendum. For Turkish Cypriots to leave the EU without a referendum would be foolish as well as undemocratic.

Alper Ali Riza is a king’s counsel in the UK and a retired part time judge