Membership talk may well be premature, so why is it now in the public domain?

Cyprus acceding to Nato – easier said than done? If so, why did the government float the idea, with President Nikos Christodoulides sounding sanguine about the prospects? A trial balloon, intended to gauge reaction? And although the foreign minister later tried to soften the president’s remarks, it appears that things are in motion.

The previous week, Christodoulides had said the Republic of Cyprus was readying to join the alliance once Turkey waived its objections.

Next, once these remarks had generated a great deal of buzz, Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos weighed in.

Injecting some perspective, Cyprus’ top diplomat said that it was “premature” to speak of Nato membership. He stressed that membership was not a goal that could be attained in the short term.

Kombos did confirm that Cyprus wants to beef up its armaments and “increase our compatibility with Nato member states”. But he also pointed to the divergence in the standards of military training between Cyprus and the alliance.

And a few days after that, Kombos came back, calling “unnecessary” the public debate and war of words over the issue – the very debate the government itself triggered.

Some shadow play between Kombos and his boss? It’s hard to tell if the minister was gainsaying the president or if they were on the same page all along, with Kombos better articulating the government’s thoughts on the matter.

Whatever the case, the Nato accession genie was let out of the bottle.

An analyst we spoke to finds a lot to unpack here.

“Cyprus’ accession to Nato is a discussion that objectively cannot take place at this moment in time,” says Zenonas Tziarras, lecturer in the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cyprus.

“That’s because of two simple reasons: first, Turkey, a Nato member with veto power, will not allow it; and second, there are no real peace talks on the Cyprus problem that would provide the framework to integrate Nato into the discussion for the future of Cyprus, perhaps as part of the security-guarantees chapter of the negotiations.”

Tziarras detects an internal political angle as well:

“President Christodoulides’ rhetoric is exaggerating and creating great expectations for populist reasons. It helps him draw the biggest political party Disy closer to the government and away from an ambiguous opposition stance, so that he increases his legitimacy within the political scene, and maybe even sever his dependencies on certain centrist parties, such as Edek, who do not share the optimism about Nato.

“At the same time, he believes that these statements solidify Nicosia’s intentions toward the United States and other Western partners, perhaps enhancing the benefits that Cyprus might be able to reap.”

Zooming out of the internal Cypriot stage, the geopolitical analyst assesses the complexities involved.

“There’s an argument that initiating this discussion will reveal Turkey’s ‘true colours’, win Nicosia the ‘blame game’ and prompt Western allies to pressure Turkey towards certain concessions over Cyprus.

“But one should recall what happened when Sweden and Finland first tried to join Nato, breaking their long-time neutrality. Turkey turned that into a big bargain. It effectively diplomatically coerced Sweden and Finland to comply with its own terms and managed to set the agenda of the negotiation.”

This, says Tziarras, is a “bad precedent” for Cyprus, because its case is already much more complicated and difficult – a country that has arguably less strategic importance for Nato when compared to Sweden and Finland.

“One should also ask, first, to what extent would Nato like to ‘adopt’ the Cyprus problem, not least having the knowledge of the complications that the conflict created for the EU and its relations with Turkey and beyond.

“And, secondly, why has Nato remained silent on this issue? Probably because this is not a discussion it would like to have, at least not right now.”

The analyst tells the Cyprus Mail that for the island to join Nato it would first need to bring its operational capacities and capabilities up to alliance standards – and Cyprus is not there yet. Improved relations with the United States could contribute towards that direction, including for upgrading the National Guard.

“But these are moves that do not need to – and should not – be done vocally or publicly but rather prudently. Actions speak louder than words.”

According to the expert, once these steps are taken or are in the process of completion, other options may be explored absent a solution to the Cyprus problem. For instance, Cyprus becoming a ‘Major Non-Nato ally’.

This is a special designation granted by the US government to countries with which it maintains strategic partnerships but are not members of the alliance. It offers numerous military and financial benefits but does not constitute a mutual defence agreement.

Nor does the designation require Turkey’s – or anyone else’s – agreement. But it does need the candidate country to have a truly strategic relationship with Washington and be of certain standards in security/defence and other areas.

Likely this is the general direction of travel, rather than Cyprus joining Nato outright.

The alliance has 32 members. But other than Nato itself, there is the Partnership for Peace, with 18 members. There are also Nato partners – more than 40 countries.

And lastly, there are the aforementioned Major Non-Nato Allies. Twenty countries have this status.

Cyprus is one out of four European Union member states outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the only one not to participate in Nato’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU mutual solidarity clause applies to Cyprus along with other EU member states:

According to Article 42.7 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union:

“If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”

Article 42.2 specifies however that Nato shall be the main forum for the implementation of collective self-defence for EU member states that are also Nato members. Cyprus, Austria, Ireland, and Malta are the EU member states outside Nato and which resort to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

But others take a different approach to Tziarras, arguing that Nato membership could act as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

In April 2019 Damon Wilson, executive vice-president of the Atlantic Council, penned a piece enthusiastically advocating for Cyprus’ entry into the alliance.

An American think tank, the Atlantic Council has a clear Atlanticist leaning.

 “With Nato membership built into any settlement, Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, along with Athens and Ankara, and in partnership with all of their European partners and Nato allies, might have more confidence in striking a deal,” Wilson wrote.

“Cyprus remains the only European Union member who is not even a member of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace programme, due entirely to the outstanding reunification problem. Immediate Nato membership for a reunified island, however, would automatically embed, and therefore replace, a joint Greek-Turkish-British security guarantee within an Alliance commitment to the entire island without any need for alternative mechanisms.”

And what’s in it for Nato?

“As part of the agreement, Nato could establish an operations centre on the island, drawing on existing infrastructure and housing personnel from Nato allies, including Turkey. This new operations centre would provide Nato allies a common situational awareness within the Eastern Mediterranean of unchecked migration flows, illicit shipping, or potential proliferation,” Wilson explains.

“It would also support Nato planners rightly focused on the Alliance’s eastern flank and both Russian and non-state threats. Furthermore, conflict spillover from Libya to Syria exposes many southern Nato members to significant risk, and a forward operations center in Cyprus could provide valuable capabilities in these areas.”

Recent history of Cyprus-Nato relations

In February 2011 the Cypriot parliament voted to apply for membership of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. However, then president Demetris Christofias vetoed the decision, arguing it would hamper his attempts to negotiate an end to the dispute and demilitarise the island.

In February 2013, president-elect Nicos Anastasiades stated he intended to apply for membership of the PfP soon after taking office. His foreign minister (and successor) Nikos Christodoulides dismissed Cypriot membership of Nato or PfP, preferring to keep Cyprus’ foreign and defence affairs within the framework of the EU.

In October 2024, Nicosia and Washington issued a Joint Statement on the Cyprus-US Strategic Dialogue, accompanied by the signing of bilateral agreements such as the US-RoC Road Map for Bilateral Defence Cooperation.

In late 2024, Christodoulides revealed a long-term, multi-phase plan to deepen Cyprus’ ties with Nato with possible future accession during talks with US President Joe Biden.

The first strategic phase of the plan sees Cyprus join preparatory organisations linked to Nato, while acknowledging the need to resolve the Cyprus dispute and improve EU-Turkey relations. Practical steps of the plan include securing longer-term exemptions from the US arms embargo, expanding joint military training opportunities for the National Guard at US military academies, and modernising Cyprus’ defence infrastructure to meet Nato standards.