By Andreas Theophanous

When Russia launched its attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the US, the EU and other Western powers had a strong reaction. Russia soon became “the most sanctioned nation”, facing an unprecedented level of punitive measures.

Simultaneously, Western powers provided Ukraine with economic and military aid. Ukraine and the West accused Russia of violating international law, pursuing expansionism and embracing imperial ambitions. Moscow, on the other hand, accused Kyiv and the West of seeking to destabilise, weaken and fragment Russia. Moscow also accused Kyiv of systematically violating the human rights of Russian-speaking citizens in Eastern Ukraine. Above all, Moscow declared that the West had reneged on its promises not to expand Nato eastward. It also emphasised that it would never accept Ukraine’s accession to the alliance.

During that period, the dominant discourse emphasised the need to support Ukraine and condemn Russia. This stance was considered to be “the right side of history”. I vividly recall a discussion at an international conference in Nicosia in 2023, where a foreign professor – aligned with the Realist School of Thought – cynically remarked that history’s “right side” is always determined by the victors.

Notably, several American scholars, most of whom subscribe to the Realist School of Thought argued that Nato’s eastward expansion was a destabilising move. The EU, for its part, failed to grasp that the war and the resulting sanctions would also entail a cost on itself. Inevitably, the outcome would be less prosperity and less security for the union. I had repeatedly stated at the time that if there had been an effective leadership in the EU, the war might have been prevented.

With Donald Trump’s re-ascent to the US presidency, a major paradigm shift has taken place. The new administration prioritises national interests and Realpolitik. International law is not necessarily a key concern. President Trump has been highly critical of President Zelenskiy as well as of the EU. Trump has asserted that this war should have never begun. Moreover, he has emphasised that Ukraine cannot realistically expect to return to its 2014 borders and that the country’s Nato membership is not a viable prospect.

President Trump is interested in ending the war in Ukraine and avoiding an escalation that could pose security risks to the US and to the world as a whole. Above all, it is evident that the new American leadership seeks to restore relations with Russia in today’s multipolar world, where China remains the primary rival of the US. This stance clearly stems from a commitment to Realpolitik rather than international law.

Nevertheless, I firmly believe that a minimum framework of principles should govern inter-state relations. Every effort must be made to uphold international law. However, when national leaderships disregard Realpolitik and assume that international law will be enforced automatically, they risk leading their nations into real danger.

Ukraine, like any other country, had and has the right to self-determination. In the event that it is not possible for this right to be exercised, then it is preferable to concentrate on the second best option. In this regard, had it been understood that the country’s territorial integrity could have only been preserved through a policy of neutrality, history might have unfolded differently.

Both Cyprus and Greece must draw lessons from these historical and political realities. After the catastrophe of 1974, there has been confusion which seems to persist to the present day to some degree. While Cyprus needs the UN, it must also recognise the organisation’s limitations. Yes, the UN ought to function according to international law. However, the reality is that the UN operates while also taking into account the balance of power.

Let us not forget that the Annan Plan, the proposal of the then UN secretary-general in 2004 was biased as it favoured the Turkish side. The outcome of the referendum was indicative: 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected it, while 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots (and the settlers who voted) endorsed it. Furthermore, the intercommunal negotiations have for years essentially been projecting the perception that the issue is primarily bicommunal. Thus, the occupying force, Turkey, is portrayed as a third party to the problem. And this is misleading.

As for Greece, it is worth noting that the country could have supported Ukraine without unnecessarily antagonising Russia. In this regard, Greek politicians and analysts criticised the Mitsotakis government for displaying more enthusiasm for Ukraine’s cause than for Cyprus’.

In conclusion, while we must always invoke and fight for international law, it is a grave mistake to ignore the fact that the international system is strongly influenced by the pursuit of national interests.

Professor Andreas Theophanous is the president of the Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs