For all intents and purposes what is being proposed by the Greek Cypriot side is not a BBF. It is a unitary state

Tomorrow, Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, Greek and British representatives will meet with the United Nations secretary-general in Geneva to discuss the Cyprus problem, for the umpteenth time, going back to 1968 when the inter-communal negotiations first began. It is difficult to get excited about any positive outcomes from this given the UN’s own assessment that there is no common ground between the Greek and Turkish sides. The “macho” pre-meeting rhetoric is also not encouraging.

There will be two conflicting approaches put on the table. What the Turkish side wants is a Turkish Cypriot state and international recognition. Leaving the merits and challenges of this proposition aside, it is, from a technical point of view, an easy model to understand.

But what about the bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF) model? What does this really mean? It might have meant something meaningful in 1977 when Makarios and Denktash agreed to this approach, but would its practical implementation today really be any different to a unitary solution?

In 1977, the current European Union (EU) did not exist. At that time, its predecessor organisation, the European Economic Community was purely an economic alliance and included only nine states. Now, the European Union has become a much more integrated alliance of 27 states which encompasses not only trade, but also finance, currency, agriculture, economy and the environment.

More to the point, current EU laws grant anyone from any EU country a form of “EU citizenship”, giving any citizen the right to move and reside freely within member states, own property, live, work, study and invest. These “freedoms” reflect the core values and principles of the European Union.

A bizonal and bicommunal federation, on the other hand, is based on two distinct constituent states forming a central federal government. Each operates on pre-defined territory assigned to that state (bizonal), and each community resides in its own territory (bicommunal). The federal government makes policy on country-wide issues. The security, ethnicity and linguistic and cultural make up of each area are protected through agreed rules.

We can immediately see that there is an inherent conflict between the BBF model and EU laws.

In relation to property, if BBF is limiting property restitution (i.e. preventing Greek Cypriots from reclaiming homes in the north or Turkish Cypriots in the south), it could be deemed to contravene EU legal standards.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) could strike down laws that restrict employment opportunities based on ethnicity or residence.

In relation to a rotating presidency, there would be concerns about whether an ethnic quota system would conflict with EU non-discrimination principles.

The bizonal system, in itself, may be deemed to contravene EU laws which guarantee that all its citizens have the right to move, live and work anywhere within the union without discrimination.

The 2004 Annan plan did attempt to address these issues. To maintain bicommunal balance, the plan proposed temporary quotas on the number of Greek Cypriots allowed to settle in the Turkish Cypriot zone. The plan recognised that full property restitution (allowing Greek Cypriots to reclaim land in the north) could destabilise the smaller Turkish Cypriot state. For this reason, it proposed a mix of compensation, property exchange and limited restitution. The plan also proposed that EU provides financial assistance for the development of the northern part of Cyprus following a settlement so that the differences in, for example, property prices do not create conditions which undermine bicommunality.

The EU was prepared to grant derogations from its laws on property rights to protect the bizonal structure, and limiting the size of the Greek Cypriot population in the north. But these derogations were always accepted as being temporary. The suggestion was that over time, these restrictions would be eased, gradually aligning Cyprus with EU freedom of movement and settlement laws. How this would be done was not specified because derogations are meant to be permanent and unalterable.

The Annan Plan was not implemented, so we will never know if its agreement would have withstood any subsequent legal challenges.

Each of the 27 EU countries need to be persuaded to accept the terms of the “re-admission” of the new Cyprus entity with these new derogations. It is unlikely that they all will do so because these go against the EU’s fundamental “DNA” freedoms of movement, settlement and employment.

Today, it would seem to be absurd for two constituent states of a BBF federation to be compelled, under EU rules, to take in immigrants from within or outside the EU, but limit the number of Cypriots living on the “other” side of the island from moving across.

If the Greek Cypriot leadership has a sincere wish to implement a BBF, they need first to clarify that this is actually deliverable through EU derogations before embarking on any negotiations. They also need to ensure that funding is available from the EU to achieve economic parity in the north to prevent the undermining of bicommunality.

If these objectives prove impossible because the EU will not countenance such challenging exemptions, or find necessary funding, then for all intents and purposes what is being proposed by the Greek Cypriot side is not a BBF. It is a unitary state. 

A unitary state approach would ring alarm bells among Turkish Cypriots. In the absence of checks and balances provided by a BBF solution, major situations of conflict can arise over property and immigration. The north could be quickly overwhelmed by large numbers of south Cypriot citizens or residents. These would not only be Greek Cypriots, but would include immigrants in southern Cyprus from Greece, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Philippines and others, adding to their existing immigration problems.

Every Cypriot wants peace, having suffered so much in the past. It is important for all Cyprus politicians to think very carefully about any future solutions so that past mistakes are not repeated.

Fahri Zihni is former chair of Council of Turkish Cypriot Associations (UK), a former policy advisor at the UK’s Cabinet Office and a former president of the Society of IT Management, UK