For Cyprus, Greece’s defence deal with Israel raises questions over what Nicosia ultimately wants its security policy to achieve

Greece’s €3 billion Achilles Shield deal with Israel is expected to significantly strengthen the country’s ability to protect itself against drones, aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, but experts caution against expectations that the system will offer absolute protection, or that Cyprus will automatically come under the same umbrella.

The deal has also fuelled a wider discussion over what the growing defence relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Israel actually means, particularly after Defence Minister Vasilis Palmas said this week that Achilles Shield also strengthens Cyprus’ protection and that the three countries face a common threat from Turkey.

For Panagiotis Tsakonas, professor of International Relations at the University of Athens and head of the Foreign Policy and Security Programme at ELIAMEP, Achilles Shield is certainly an important development for Greece, both in terms of the capabilities it will acquire and the message these send.

“It means not only quantitative, but also qualitative strengthening of Greece’s deterrent efforts,” he told the Cyprus Mail.

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The quantitative element, he explained, comes from the systems themselves and their connection with other platforms Greece has acquired or plans to acquire. The qualitative element comes when these capabilities are translated into greater deterrence.

But this has limits.

“It does not mean the creation of a formal alliance,” Tsakonas said.

Under the agreement signed with Israel on August 31, Greece will acquire David’s Sling and SPYDER systems from Rafael, BARAK MX from Israel Aerospace Industries and MMR radars, which will be brought together through a new command-and-control system. According to Israel’s defence ministry, the agreement is worth around €3 billion, alongside a separate €26 million deal for Drone Dome counter-drone systems.

The idea is to create different layers of protection; different sensors detect and assess an incoming threat, while different systems can respond depending on whether that threat is, for example, a drone, aircraft or missile, and at what distance and altitude it is approaching.

Lieutenant General (ret) Konstantinos Loukopoulos, a geostrategic analyst, said such a system was something Greece needed, particularly after lessons learned from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

What concerns him, however, is the “climate of euphoria” surrounding it and suggestions that Greece will now enjoy something approaching complete protection.

“No system, however perfect it may be, provides absolute protection,” he told the Cyprus Mail.

An attacker can attempt to overwhelm even a sophisticated defence by sending large numbers of missiles and drones at the same time, or try to exhaust its stocks of interceptors.

Loukopoulos goes further, arguing that Achilles Shield should primarily be understood as protection, rather than deterrence. “Achilles did not only have a shield, he also had a spear and a sword,” he said. “Victory is not brought by the shield, the shield provides protection.”

Tsakonas takes a somewhat broader view. Better protection, he argues, strengthens deterrence because it makes military pressure against Greece more difficult.

“It creates a dome, it closes gaps,” he said.

This does not mean Achilles Shield changes the military balance between Greece and Turkey, something on which both analysts agree.

Rather, Tsakonas said, it complicates Ankara’s operational choices and sends a stronger message before a confrontation occurs.

There is, however, another consequence. What Greece considers an entirely rational attempt to increase its own security can be interpreted very differently in Ankara.

“Achilles Shield deepens, by all means, the existing security dilemma,” Tsakonas said.

One country increases its military capabilities because it feels threatened, the other sees those new capabilities as a threat and responds, prompting the first country to respond again.

“What matters is not what I think. What matters is what the others whom the choice concerns understand,” he said.

The same applies to the increasingly close relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Diplomatically, Tsakonas said, the countries may insist that their cooperation is not directed against anyone, but perceptions matter, particularly in Ankara.

This becomes particularly relevant when Cyprus enters the discussion.

Greece, Cyprus and Israel have been moving steadily closer for years. Their 2026 Joint Action Plan includes joint operational activities, special forces training, staff meetings and consultations, according to Greece’s National Defence General Staff.

Tsakonas sees this as an important evolution. What began largely as a diplomatic alignment between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, later joined by the US through the 3+1 format, is becoming more institutionalised and, to some extent, operationally strengthened.

That, however, is not the same thing as common defence. Achilles Shield, he stressed, is designed for Greece and Greek territory. “There is no common defence,” he said.

Neither does the fact that Cyprus has acquired BARAK MX mean the Cypriot and Greek systems will automatically operate together.

Loukopoulos said common equipment does not in itself mean integration. Geography, interoperability and, crucially, command-and-control would all have to be addressed before such a network could exist.

For Tsakonas, taking Achilles Shield beyond Greece and turning it into something covering Cyprus or the wider Eastern Mediterranean would require political decisions which have not been taken.

It would also raise a much bigger question, whether Greece and Cyprus want to move towards the militarisation of a common strategy towards Turkey, effectively reviving the logic of a common defence space.

He cautioned against taking a system with a specific operational and geographical scope and politically extending its meaning across the Eastern Mediterranean.

“That is both wrong and dangerous,” he said.

There is another issue Greece will have to contend with, dependence on Israel.

Loukopoulos questioned whether it is wise for such an important part of the country’s air and ballistic missile defence to depend on technology from a single state.

Athens appears conscious of this. Speaking in July about Achilles Shield’s Command and Control system, Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias said Greece would not acquire such a critical system without access to its source code, warning that otherwise the country could become a “hostage”, even to the friendliest foreign country or ally.

Tsakonas also cautioned against another assumption which has emerged around the increasingly close relationship with Israel, that the partnership means Israel would necessarily come to Greece’s aid if deterrence failed and conflict with Turkey broke out.a

“There is no such possibility,” he said.

“It is one thing to increase my deterrent capabilities and another thing, when deterrence fails and I have a conflict, who will help.”

For Cyprus, he argues, the more important question may therefore not be how the island can get beneath Achilles Shield, but what Nicosia ultimately wants its security policy to achieve.

If the objective remains a settlement of the Cyprus problem, decisions should also be judged by whether they improve those prospects or make them more difficult.