After 60 years of separation between the two Cypriot sides, a federal solution is a high-risk objective
By Fahri Zihni
The last time a framework statement of “common understanding” was agreed between Turkish and Greek Cypriots was about the hellim/halloumi issue, and that story ended in tears because it was a fudge, lacking in detail.
With such scant public information about Unficyp chief Colin Stewart’s Pile/Pyla “common understanding” proposal, we can only keep our fingers crossed that the necessary detail will emerge, and positivity will pave the way for new negotiations.
But what are the chances of a federal solution, which the Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides is ostensibly seeking to achieve, while the Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar is resolutely in favour of a two-state solution?
We know that at the collapse of Crans-Montana talks in July 2017, Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades approached the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and floated the possibility of a two-state solution for Cyprus. His interest in this option was later corroborated by the late Archbishop Chrysostomos II in an interview with Politis newspaper, and former Akel leader Andros Kyprianou.
So, why would an experienced and shrewd Greek Cypriot president be invested in this option? We cannot see into his mind, but we can look at the risk-reward composition of this option for a politician in power.
The Republic of Cyprus constitution of 1960 was itself a federal solution, but it failed to serve the needs of the two communities in its first three years. From December 1963, it collapsed altogether after hundreds died and 25,000 Turkish, 500 Armenian and 200 Greek Cypriots were made refugees following internecine fighting. So, for the last 60 years, Greek Cypriot elected governments and institutions enjoyed mono-ethnic national decision making to the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots.
Under a federal solution, politicians, civil servants, EU Officials, business leaders, NGOs, central banks, health services and other major national institutions would need to accept power-sharing and accommodate Turkish Cypriots among their ranks, some at senior levels, and vacate positions for them to fill. How will they react?
Greek and Turkish Cypriots have known no other adversaries but one another and their opposite “parent” countries of Greece and Turkey since 1960, and issues such as the sharing of east Mediterranean gas reserves remain fiercely contested to this day. Making policing and military decisions and implementing them through mixed ethnicity ministries, police, army, navy and air force officers would be pose a big challenge, with much scope for relationships going very badly wrong.
One of most complex and taxing concerns is about property, and how it is managed under a federal configuration. Between 1963 and 1974, there were 162,000 displaced Greek Cypriots, about one-third of their community, and 55,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees, about one half of their community. Assuming one land/property asset owner per 10 refugees, there would be 21,700 cases which would need to be adjudicated. After the passage of 60 years and many generations of descendants, addressing an incomplete, inaccurate and often out of date land register, and determining current ownership and market valuation would be very intense and laborious. Navigating complex issues surrounding exchange, restitution and compensation would be very contentious and challenging.
There are extensive developments which have fundamentally changed the use of land, forever, such as the building of Larnaca airport on Turkish Cypriot land in the south, and the new “Russian” town of Yeni Iskele (Trikomo) in the north which sits mainly on Greek Cypriot-owned land.
All this would take decades to resolve, and many cases will be highly contentious between the two ethnic communities with a dark history behind them, where missing persons, often gruesomely killed by the “other side” are still being dug-up. Will people be prepared to wait that long, or will they take the law into their own hands? What will happen if people under threat of eviction from their decades’ long homes and businesses on either side have nowhere to go, and resist? Will this spark violence?
With increasing nationalist fervour in the south demonstrated by the expansion of Elam’s popularity and influence, will those who are currently engaging in violence against immigrants be turning their attention to their age-old enemies, as they see it, the Turks of Cyprus? Following anti-Turkish Eoka (established 1954) and Eoka-B (established 1971), will an Eoka-C emerge? These may, or, hopefully, may not materialise, but fears and mistrust about these potentialities still exist in many Turkish Cypriot minds as the smaller population. This is aside from fears by both sides of possible military interventions by Greece or Turkey, should friction erupt.
Whilst the federal Annan Plan of 2004, rejected by Greek Cypriots, has hitherto been the most sophisticated and plausible attempt at a solution, the demographic landscape on both sides has changed significantly. In nearly 20 years, another generation of people born on the “other side” have died. Families have become more “embedded” in their sector, including large populations of new immigrants.
Those in the south who are doing well out of personal and commercial use of Turkish Cypriot properties would most likely not wish to risk losing what they already have in a new federation and resist. The same would apply to Turkish Cypriots in the north in reverse.
Anastasiades, at the pinnacle of his political career, heading up a strident economy, rubbing shoulders with French, German, British and American heads of state, and with a reasonable legacy to follow after his retirement will not have failed to see the plethora of potential high-risk failures stacked up against him in the implementation of a federal solution.
He might even have been worried about the potential for violence, running over decades, with all the blame inevitably attributable to him. He rejected the federal solution in favour of a two-state option because two states would give the Greek Cypriot community a clear-cut agreement with extended territory to live in, without having to share power and risking chaos, anarchy and even violence.
Through the passage of 60 years of separation between the two Cypriot communities, far too many “devils in the detail” have evolved for a federal solution to succeed equitably and peacefully. It’s a high-risk objective.
Preservation of peace which has been evident for an unprecedented 49-year period must surely be first priority, and both sides ought to have an open mind to at least discussing the two possible options without preconditions.
Fahri Zihni is former chair of Council of Turkish Cypriot Associations (UK), a former policy advisor at the UK’s Cabinet Office and a former president of Society of IT Management, UK
