The operation of the “Russian House” in Cyprus should be examined as part of Europe’s response to Russian hybrid threats, Lithuanian MEP and former defence minister Rasa Juknevičienė has said, warning that such threats are not confined to countries bordering Russia.

Speaking to the Cyprus News Agency (CNA), Juknevičienė referred specifically to the Russian House in Cyprus and similar centres operating elsewhere in Europe.

Citing public assessments by Estonian intelligence services, she said such centres could be used by Russian intelligence services, questioning whether EU member states were treating the potential threat seriously enough.

Juknevičienė, an EPP MEP, was rapporteur for the European Parliament report on hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure, adopted during September’s plenary session.

She said hybrid threats concerned the entire EU, despite being more immediately visible on its eastern flank.

According to Juknevičienė, the message from military officials in Nato countries is that “no capital in the EU is safe today”, with Russia possessing capabilities that could reach across Europe.

“This is not only about regional defence, it is about our common European defence,” she said.

She said Europe could never achieve “100 per cent preparedness”, as both the circumstances and methods used were constantly changing, pointing to the war in Ukraine and the growing importance of drones, air defence and long-range weapons.

Hybrid operations could include sabotage, arson, cyberattacks, signal jamming, drone incursions, explosives and disinformation, she said.

Juknevičienė also highlighted the use of social media, YouTube, bloggers and networks of fake accounts to amplify tensions within European societies, including over migration, and potentially influence electoral processes.

She described the situation as a “grey-zone war”, arguing that Russia seeks to operate below the threshold that could trigger Nato’s Article 5 collective defence provision.

Hybrid activities could also seek to create fear within European societies and alter public attitudes towards support for Ukraine, she said.

Drawing on Lithuania’s experience, Juknevičienė referred to migration pressure on the Belarus border since 2021, meteorological balloons entering Lithuanian territory and concerns surrounding drones and possible “false flag” operations.

She also pointed to the need to protect critical infrastructure, noting that Lithuania has strengthened security around its liquefied natural gas terminal.

One of the EU’s main challenges, she said, was ensuring incidents in different member states were not viewed in isolation.

Signal interference, attempts to damage railway infrastructure, explosives and drone incidents occurring across different countries should be assessed together to determine whether they form part of a broader pattern, she said.

Juknevičienė called for stronger European coordination and mechanisms allowing member states to build a common picture of hybrid activity.

She also addressed developments in Georgia, where she said the current political leadership was moving away from the European path despite what she described as strongly pro-European sentiment within Georgian society.

She argued that the EU should continue supporting civil society and pro-European forces in Georgia.

Juknevičienė concluded that Europe needed a common strategy towards Russia, saying the war in Ukraine was directly linked to Europe’s future security and that European support for Ukraine should continue.