Conditions of independence cemented nationalist rivalry
By Leontios Ierodiaconou
It seems that in some political circles, there are excessive concerns about “political equality” between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in any future solution. Inevitably, these fears are strengthened by the bad experiences of the first three years of independence from 1960-63.
In fact, political equality may have several similarities with the “veto” in the executive and “separate majorities” in the legislature, which created serious difficulties to the smooth functioning of the political system post-independence. Yet, it is of course important to note that one positive vote in the executive and enhanced majorities on some issues in the legislature are far milder practices than the veto or separate majorities of the 1960 constitution.
When in the 1950s Greek Cypriots began to intensify their struggle for enosis, Turkish Cypriots – both with encouragement from Turkey and locally with the acquiescence or encouragement of the British administration – began to fight against it. Initially, this was with the main slogan “Cyprus is Turkish” and by early 1957 it was aimed at partition or taksim.
Since then, relations between the two communities deteriorated steadily. At times they led to intercommunal unrest culminating in 1958 in widespread bloody clashes with several dozen dead on both sides.
The Zurich Accords, on the basis of which the 1960 constitution was formed, were manifestly one-sided in Greek Cypriot minds. The participation ratio was 70:30 in government, parliament and the civil service and 60:40 in the police and army. There was also the veto in the executive and separate majorities in the legislature that went far beyond securing minority rights, creating instead an equal political status for the two communities.
Moreover, the non-participation of the Cypriots in the negotiations, at the stage of formulating the agreements, did not help to legitimise them in the minds of those who believed that they were being wronged. It would not be an exaggeration to say that both the leadership and the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots saw the implementation of those agreements and the constitution as the main reason for the failure of the longed-for goal of enosis.
This political atmosphere had an inhibiting effect on the Greek Cypriot side’s cooperation in the faithful and smooth functioning of the constitution, while the Turkish Cypriots demanded (to protect and preserve their privileges) its literal implementation.
When the constitution came into force in 1960, the experiences of the nationalist antagonism between the two communities in previous years (especially the bloody intercommunal riots in 1958) were still fresh. Thus suspicion and lack of trust prevailed in both communities.
In other words, the nationalist antagonism of the past not only continued unabated, but the need for the practical application of provisions in the constitution made it even more intense.
To make the political atmosphere that prevailed more comprehensible, Glafkos Clerides – who was at that time, second in command and a close associate of Makarios – from his many experiences with the archbishop concluded that by the time he signed the Zurich-London Agreements in February 1959, Makarios had already decided to reverse the negative provisions in the course of time. (Clerides G., “My Testimony”, vol. 1, p.187).
Moreover, Makarios himself four years later in a letter sent to the then Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou wrote: “I am the signatory of the Zurich-London Agreements on behalf of the Greeks of Cyprus. In my personal opinion, under the conditions prevailing at the time, these were otherwise born…… But I did not believe for a moment that the agreements would constitute a permanent regime.” (Vlachos A., “Ten years of Cyprus p.249”).
Even though the Zurich Agreements explicitly ruled out both enosis and partition, the vision of union with Greece was still alive among Greek Cypriots. Everyone knew this. That is why Turkish Cypriots had every reason to be suspicious and worried. And the Greek Cypriots made no serious effort to alleviate these concerns. On the contrary, on every national holiday (especially on April 1), ministers, deputies, former Eoka section chiefs made speeches at national gatherings, usually emphasising that the cause for which Eoka had fought had not been abandoned.
Makarios himself, in a speech at the unveiling of the bust of Eoka hero, Markos Drakos, on October 20, 1962, declared: “His figure, forever young, will hover from the place of his sacrifice… until the dream of national restoration becomes reality. For unwavering remain the goals and unchanged the end of our struggles. History cannot be falsified, and the agreements, which were dictated by given conditions, cannot bind consciences indefinitely.” (Christodoulou, M. “The Course of an Era”, p.322).
Another reason that contributed to the continuation of the nationalist rivalry was that the various institutions that would take future decisions of the executive power were staffed by leading members of Eoka who had fought for enosis, and from the Turkish community by leading members of TMT who had fought against enosis.
The only place where there could be even a slight difference was in the legislatures. But even in this case, a deliberate mistake was made. A majoritarian electoral system was adopted which allowed the central leadership of each side to control the composition of the central parliament as well.
Thus, everything remained subordinated to ethnic rivalry. For example, the constitution stipulated that tax issues required separate majorities of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members of parliament. Although the taxes were a purely economic issue, Turkish Cypriot MPs refused to vote for them not because they disagreed with their economic content, but to put pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to achieve other goals, such as separate town halls or the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the civil service, things that were part of a nationalist vision. Through a parallel nationalist mindset, the Greek Cypriots refused to implement these provisions.
To a large extent, the majoritarian electoral system helped the maintenance of a continuous nationalist rivalry, by downgrading and subordinating all other socio-political matters. It left no room for the development of normal social divisions which, in turn, would probably also lead to intercommunal cooperation (even if tentative) on political, social, ideological and class criteria.
In this climate of constant antagonistic nationalism, Makarios’ initiative to proceed with a revision of the constitution (known as the 13 points) towards the end of 1963 led to the well-known bloody conflicts of 1963-64. The tenuous, de facto situation created by the establishment of Turkish Cypriot enclaves lasted until the coup and the Turkish invasion of 1974.
During this period individual intercommunal clashes occurred from time to time, the most serious cases being the fighting in Tylliria and the bombing by the Turkish air force in the summer of 1964 and the military operation in Kofinou towards the end of 1967. The years 1964-74 caused new wounds in the relations of the two communities.
Certainly, incomparably deeper wounds were caused by the Turkish invasion that followed, which, apart from the thousands of dead and missing persons, resulted in the forcible displacement of more than a third of Greek Cypriots and an even greater proportion of the Turkish Cypriots.
Six decades have passed since the first hostilities began. Many things have changed – the displacement of a large part of the population, the deaths in the various conflicts (especially during the invasion), the many missing persons, the alteration of the population, the Islamisation of both the environment and the culture in the occupied territories. All these changes have created not only new wounds but also, at first sight, new difficulties for the smooth functioning of a bicommunal political system.
Thought and life, however, must not stop at these. We must look to the future. We must not remain apathetic with a fatalistic view of reality. Returning to the possibility of a solution, some conditions are probably more favourable now for a solution to work than in the 1960s.
Leontios Ierodiaconou, is a former Disy deputy and also served as minister of communications and works in the Clerides government. He is the author of several books, the latest being Fatal Leadership (1948-2021): Makarios and his Continuers. The second part of this article will appear next week
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