By Ioannis Tirkides

It is widely acknowledged by diplomatic observers and historians alike that the Conference on Cyprus held in Crans-Montana in July 2017 represented the high-water mark, the closest the two sides had ever come to a solution since the division of the island in 1974. Consequently, the collapse of the talks marked not merely a pause, but a definitive inflection point in the historical trajectory of the Cyprus problem. In the intervening years, the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically; all principal stakeholders have recalibrated their strategic positions, and subsequent attempts to resurrect the peace process have been fruitless.

While the election of a Turkish Cypriot leader who ostensibly projects a greater willingness for dialogue offers a tentative basis for optimism, the fundamental reality remains unchanged: the two communities are currently traversing diverging, and likely conflicting, trajectories. Within this context, the persistent charm by political leadership of “restarting negotiations from where we left off at Crans-Montana” has devolved into an empty slogan. Far from serving as a constructive catalyst for a return to the negotiating table, this mantra complicates the prevailing reality. It conceals a perilous truth: that a shared frame of reference for negotiations effectively no longer exists. If the involved parties cannot establish a consensus on the definition of the status quo ante—what “where we left off” actually entails—the outlook is not merely obscure; it is volatile and possesses the potential for explosive geopolitical backlash.

The architecture of the ‘grand bargain’

The Crans-Montana conference was distinguished by its comprehensive ambition. Unlike previous iterations of the peace process, the framework was engineered to address the entirety of all the hard issues simultaneously. The conference was structured into two parallel negotiating streams, or tables as they were called. The first table addressed internal dimensions, specifically territory, property rights, and governance structures. The second table focused on the external dimensions, namely security, international guarantees, and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

The conference culminated in what became known as the ‘Guterres Framework’—a six-point mechanism devised by the UN Secretary-General to rupture the cycle of ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.’ The Secretary-General’s strategic intent was to forge a package deal that would lock the leaders into simultaneous concessions regarding the six most contentious issues of the Cyprus problem as perceived. The required quid pro quo was more or less obvious: a trade-off between security – specifically the termination of guarantees, a primary Greek Cypriot condition – and governance – specifically political equality and its operational expression, a primary Turkish Cypriot condition.

The substantive negation of the Guterres Framework

While the current Greek Cypriot leadership frequently professes a readiness to resume talks from where they were left off at Crans-Montana, the existence of a common reference point is highly contestable. Upon close examination of substance and form—setting aside moral justifications—it becomes evident that the Greek Cypriot side has effectively rejected nearly all six pillars of the Guterres Framework. Consequently, the probability of a solution derived from this basis is low. The following analysis details this divergence:

Security and Guarantees: The Guterres Framework explicitly stipulates that rights of intervention and the Treaty of Guarantee must be terminated, to be replaced by a new implementation mechanism. While the specific conditions under which Turkey might have acceded to this are debated, the Greek Cypriot stance has solidified around the maxim of ‘zero troops and zero guarantees.’ This implies the immediate and total abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee upon ratification of a settlement. Current leadership, having emphasized that any preservation of intervention rights is ‘out of the question,’ effectively rejects the nuanced, phased transition proposed by the Secretary-General.

Troop Levels: The framework mandated a drastic reduction of forces to 1960 levels, deferring the ultimate decision—whether troops would depart permanently (a ‘sunset clause’) or be subject to periodic assessment (a ‘review clause’)—to the Prime Ministers of the guarantor powers. The Greek Cypriot leadership has categorically rejected the ‘review clause,’ insisting exclusively on a rigid ‘sunset clause’ with a definitive end date, thereby eliminating the flexibility inherent in the UN proposal.

Political Equality: On governance, the framework explicitly calls for a rotating presidency with a 2:1 ratio and requires at least one positive Turkish Cypriot vote for all federal decisions. In the post-2017 era, the Greek Cypriot leadership has effectively retracted support for this model, arguing that a universal ‘positive vote’ requirement would engender a ‘dysfunctional state.’ Instead, they have proposed deadlock-resolving mechanisms limited only to issues of ‘vital interest.’ This attempt to narrow the definition of political equality falls significantly below the threshold established by Guterres, likely driven by historical anxieties regarding the paralysis of the 1960 constitution in the early life of the Republic.

Equivalent Treatment: The framework mandates ‘equitable treatment’ for Turkish nationals regarding legal status and residency rights. The Greek Cypriot leadership has designated the extension of EU-style freedoms to Turkish nationals as a ‘red line,’ rejecting the concept entirely. The prevailing argument is that such a concession would serve as a demographic backdoor, allowing Turkey to colonize the island.

The Property Dimension: Perhaps the deepest philosophical chasm lies within the property pillar. The Guterres Framework prioritizes the rights of the dispossessed owner in territories to be returned, but crucially, prioritizes the current user in areas designated to remain under Turkish Cypriot administration. The Greek Cypriot president has conceded that prioritizing the user ‘does not align with his philosophical positions’ on human rights. by insisting that the legal owner must retain the right of first refusal in all instances, the Greek Cypriot side ideologically nullifies the ‘user priority’ pillar, which is central to the territorial compromise.

Territorial Adjustments: The framework necessitated the return of Morphou. However, this concession was inextricably linked to the broader package deal. By negating the pillars of political equality and property regimes, the Greek Cypriot side has effectively nullified the incentives for the corresponding territorial concessions.

The paradox of bizonality

The Greek Cypriot treatment of the framework exposes a more profound contradiction: the effective negation of the concept of bizonality itself, indirectly. While there is verbal support for a ‘bizonal, bicommunal federation,’ it is frequently conditioned on full alignment with ‘European values and principles.’

The foundational logic of a bizonal, bicommunal federation dictates that each community administers a distinct constituent state wherein they comprise a clear majority of the population and hold a clear majority of property ownership. However, insisting on the absolute priority of the original owner—implying complete restitution in areas remaining under Turkish Cypriot jurisdiction—renders the functional definition of bizonality impossible. Under such a scenario, demographics and ownership structures would revert to pre-1974 levels. If the Turkish Cypriot constituent state were to administer territory owned almost exclusively by Greek Cypriots, it would be reduced to an ‘empty shell,’ devoid of the economic basis provided by land and capital.

If the agricultural and tourism sectors in the north were to revert to Greek Cypriot ownership, the Turkish Cypriot polity would lose its economic sovereignty. The Guterres Framework sought to resolve this via distinct property regimes. By rejecting ‘user priority’ in the north on the grounds of abstract human rights, the Greek Cypriot side is, in practice, arguing for a unitary state masquerading as a federation. While this stance may appeal to domestic moral sentiment, it is incompatible with the political compromise of bizonality—a concept born not of ideal democratic theory, but of the hard geopolitical realities of 1974.

The geopolitical risk of stalemate

The collapse at Crans-Montana was more than a failed diplomatic round; it catalyzed a paradigm shift in the conflict. In the aftermath, the Turkish strategic position evolved. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership began a calculated pivot away from the federal model toward a ‘two-state solution’ or ‘sovereign equality.’ This should not be interpreted strictly as the immediate creation of two fully recognized sovereign states, but rather as a hardening of the baseline for any future engagement.

The Greek Cypriot leadership currently stands at odds with the substantive elements of the Guterres Framework, harboring a divergent vision for both the solution and the methodology to achieve it. Furthermore, there is an obvious overestimation of the European Union’s capacity to provide security guarantees that would satisfy the anxieties of Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots. The situation is analogous to two trains on a collision course. In the current, highly volatile global geopolitical environment, the costs of this diplomatic failure are escalating precipitously. We are not merely in a state of stagnation; we are sleepwalking toward a state of permanent, and potentially explosive, instability.

Ioannis Tirkides, economist and president of the Cyprus Economic Society. Views expressed are personal.