Iran and the limits of force

The strategic question of the day after

The United States and Israel continue to strike Iran. Tehran is responding largely on its own, targeting Israeli and American positions as well as installations across the Gulf. Military deployments are expanding. Energy markets are already reacting.

The central question is no longer why diplomacy failed – if it ever had a chance to succeed – but what strategic objectives are being pursued and whether the actors involved have an exit strategy and a clear plan for the day after. Military action answers the question of force. It rarely answers what comes next.

Iran: deterrence through escalation

For Iran, the overriding objective is regime survival. Its strategy relies on asymmetric leverage: ballistic missiles, maritime disruption, pressure on regional energy infrastructure and, when useful, the activation of allied non-state actors. The recent Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel remind that these networks, though weakened, have not disappeared.

Iran’s deterrence is not symmetrical; it is systemic. If the costs of attacking Iran become sufficiently high – not only for the combatants but for the wider region and the global economy – external actors may press Washington and Jerusalem to step back from further escalation.

The strategic message from Tehran is unmistakable: war with Iran will not remain confined to Iran. Regime collapse could engulf attacker and defender alike – Samson’s logic applied to geopolitics: “Let me die with the Philistines.” The aim is deterrence through the threat of uncontrollable escalation.

A dimension rarely discussed in Western analysis is the powerful Shiite tradition of martyrdom. It reaches back to the assassination of Imam Ali and the martyrdom of his son Imam Hussein – both close relatives of the Prophet Muhammad – events that profoundly shaped the historical consciousness of Shia Islam. The killing of Ayatollah Khamenei would be seen across the Shia world not simply as a political assassination but as martyrdom, carrying deep symbolic and mobilising power capable of transforming political conflict into sacred struggle. Calls for jihad against the US have already begun to circulate. One senior Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, has reportedly issued a fatwa describing vengeance against America as a religious duty for Muslims.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the most potent instrument in the strategy of Iran. Disruption of traffic through this narrow waterway is already reverberating through global energy markets, shipping insurance costs and financial systems – transforming a regional war into a global economic shock.

Israel: destroying the threat

For Israel, the nuclear programme of Iran, its ballistic missile arsenal and its network of armed proxies form a single integrated threat. Military action therefore aims not merely at retaliation but at destroying that capability.

Israeli doctrine has long held that existential threats must be addressed early, before they mature into irreversible dangers.

The preferred outcome for Israel would be a regime in Tehran that abandons hostility and nuclear ambitions. Short of that, a weakened Iran would still represent a strategic gain.

History offers a cautionary reminder. The collapse or fragmentation of a large state rarely produces stability. Bombs can destroy facilities; they cannot determine the political future of a country of 93 million people.

Nor should one underestimate the historical memory of a civilisation that still sees itself as heir to the Persian empires – a civilisation that endured conquest and upheaval and repeatedly re-emerged long after the armies of Alexander the Great had passed.

The United States: deterrence under constraint

The position of Washington is more complex. The US seeks simultaneously to support Israel’s security, prevent nuclear proliferation, safeguard global energy flows and avoid a wider regional war. All Gulf monarchies are American allies and host US military facilities.

At the same time, Washington is already managing multiple theatres of strategic competition – in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and increasingly in cyber and advanced technological domains. A prolonged Middle Eastern war risks strategic overstretch – the classic danger of great powers fighting on too many fronts. For Washington, the challenge is therefore not simply military success but the preservation of strategic balance across multiple theatres of competition.

Domestic politics also shape American foreign policy decision-making. With midterm elections approaching, the White House must weigh military choices against economic stability, financial markets and the expectations of its political base.

A broader question is therefore being debated: did the US enter the conflict primarily to defend its own security interests, or was it drawn into a confrontation whose immediate trigger lay elsewhere? Washington argues that preventing Iranian nuclear capability and protecting regional stability constitute vital interests. Critics ask what specific imminent threat justified the timing of the strikes.

Beyond these immediate calculations lies a broader strategic shift: the gradual redrawing of the Middle East’s security architecture involving Israel, the Gulf states, Iran and the external powers shaping the regional balance of power.

The wider geopolitical chessboard: Russia and China

What happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. Russia may benefit from higher global energy prices and from Western strategic distraction. Russian oil continues to flow to Asian markets.

Yet the equation cuts both ways. Moscow remains heavily absorbed by the war in Ukraine. Had it not been so deeply engaged there, its ability to shape developments across the Middle East might well have been greater.

China watches the crisis with caution. Beijing depends heavily on Gulf energy supplies and observes how American attention and resources are distributed across multiple crises.

For Chinese strategists, the war offers a real-time lesson in the limits of deterrence and the political consequences of intervention. Some in Beijing may also conclude that if major powers increasingly autointerpret international rules, similar arguments could one day be invoked elsewhere – including in the Taiwan Strait.

Europe: the economics of instability

For Europe, the crisis is felt first through economics. Disruption in the Gulf affects energy prices, shipping routes, financial markets and global trade flows. The continent continues to absorb the consequences of the war in Ukraine and remains sensitive to new energy shocks. Though geographically distant, European economies remain tightly linked to Gulf stability – with effects quickly reaching households and industry.

Turkey: calibrated ambiguity

Turkey has adopted strategic patience, preserving flexibility to reposition itself as the conflict evolves.

Ankara seeks to avoid direct alignment with the principal actors. It condemns the strikes but also the killing of Iran’s leader – a form of calibrated, even evasive, neutrality.

Ankara is also watching closely for possible next-phase developments – particularly refugee flows and any attempt by external actors to mobilise Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and/or the Kurdish population of Iran as a potential ground component of future operations. It appears that the US and Israel are doing exactly that. 

Should the conflict weaken Iran or create a regional vacuum, Ankara will seek to expand its economic and political footprint and ensure it is not excluded from shaping whatever order emerges the day after.

Cyprus: a frontline reality

For Cyprus, the crisis is real. It hosts two British Sovereign Base Areas that form part of the Western strategic architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.

These facilities have long been part of the regional security equation. Missile threats directed at the Akrotiri base underline how quickly the war with Iran has already extended beyond its original theatre.

The deployment of additional defensive assets by Greece, France, the UK, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands to help shield EU member Cyprus, is also a reflection of broader efforts to reinforce regional security. Yet the presence of civilian communities within the bases illustrates a sobering reality: in modern conflicts the line between military and civilian space can quickly blur.

The Republic of Cyprus is not part of the military operations against Iran. It continues to perform another role that is often overlooked but strategically important – that of a humanitarian bridge. Its proximity to the region, combined with stability, infrastructure and EU membership, allows it to serve as a platform for evacuations, humanitarian assistance and emergency coordination when crises erupt across the Middle East – a role it has successfully performed several times in the past.

The unanswered question

Military action answers the question of force. It does not answer the question of what comes next.

The region already faces the prospect of prolonged instability, energy shocks and intensified geopolitical rivalry. Even if the fighting stabilises, diplomacy will eventually have to address the strategic dispute that military force alone cannot resolve.

Wars are often easier to start than to conclude. Strategy ultimately lies not in the strike itself but in the political settlement that must follow.

Until such a settlement begins to take shape, one unanswerable question remains: what does the day after look like?

Euripides L. Evriviades, ambassador (Ad Honorem), is now a senior fellow at the Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia