By Kerry Abbott

The round table meeting on Cyprus due to take place next month may be postponed. The reason has been heard before: no common ground. In a previous piece, I wrote about why ill-conceived efforts in Cyprus have failed and how solid ground has to be developed, and does not just appear.

Traditional negotiating methods routinely fail and, yet, more functional conflict resolution is not practised. That would include strategic considerations that leverage relationships and develop incentives or a new way of viewing a conflict and what its resolution could offer. Even the most entrenched opponent can alter his views once the benefits of change are made clear.

As a Supreme Court-certified mediator practising for 25 years in 23 divided societies, I help people develop more functional ways of analysing the systems surrounding conflicts and devise a range of complex solutions. These impact pathways mean that various groups and individuals can intervene in productive ways, generating momentum.

In the case of Cyprus, there are some immediate and obvious opportunities that could be leveraged. Turkey, which has encouraged the intransigent position of the Turkish Cypriot leader to insist on two states as the only path to equality, wants to play a larger role in regional diplomacy. President Erdogan has offered to mediate between Ukraine and Russia, and did, along with the UN, play a role in facilitating a grain deal between them that helped to mitigate a threat to regional food supply.

However, suppose President Zelenskiy requested that before the Turkish leader entered into such a role for Ukraine, he first unblock the talks that could resolve the Cyprus conflict, by resuming negotiations where they left off at Crans-Montana. That would be a condition for playing a mediator role in Ukraine. You cannot be a source of conflict in one setting and be accepted as a peacemaker in another one. In exchange, President Zelenskiy would receive some assurances that he seeks.

Or, consider that Syria wants to rejoin the international community, and requests the end of sanctions. The United States and EU, two friends of Cyprus, both have talked of removing sanctions on the financial and energy sectors. Imagine if they requested that Syria also link its new defence deals planned with Turkey to a resolution of the Cyprus conflict? Turkey seeks to build military bases in central Syria and may acquire the Russian naval and air bases on the coast. Turkey also needs to come to an agreement with the United States over the status of the Kurdish areas in the northeast, where both have security concerns. Cyprus can be a term of leverage, as part of a package resolving all regional issues.

The question then becomes, if Turkey begins to see that the two-state solution is not viable and reverts to previous acceptable arrangements, will the Greek Cypriots have moved along enough to accept the terms offered at Crans-Montana? Will they see that the alternative could be far worse and moderate their positions?

The Turkish Cypriot minister that, under the influence of an outside power, could block any decision was one obstacle. Suppose the ministers with vetoes could be approved by Greek Cypriots as free from outside influence?

Lebanon just rid itself of an authoritarian militia order that used a blocking vote to prevent judicial appointments that could prevent their crimes from being investigated.

And what of the presence of foreign troops? In a new state, their former purpose evolves into one of a national guard and civil defence to protect half of the island from hazards. Joint training could occur and perhaps enlarge the regional stance Cyprus can have in humanitarian relief.

Lessons could be learned from the failed peace process in Israel-Palestine. Over the course of the war in Gaza, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has discussed the last peace talks he held with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. He has now published the maps, and the proposal could still resolve that conflict today, if parties recognised that the lack of a deal assures perpetual daily bloodshed.

At the time, in 2008, Abbas gave no response. It now seems his excuse was that Olmert had domestic difficulties and could not deliver on his offer. More likely, he failed to act out of fear of the unknown. Just confirming an agreement would have created its own momentum, brought an array of other interested parties to the fore, and helped overcome intervening obstacles. Once one commits to a course of action, a new range of possibilities converges to assist.

If the next round of Cyprus talks is to be productive, each participant needs to prepare for its optimal role well in advance. Just showing up for talks does not adequately address the diverse web of interests and concerns of the populations and devise appropriately detailed frameworks. Leverage needs to be employed as a safeguard that the incentives are attractive enough to sustain all parties through the difficult days ahead.

Mediators can help assure the obstacles and detours bound to appear are navigated, and the desired outcome is reached – a Cyprus with its bi-federal, bizonal nature enshrined in a state.

Kerry Abbott is a development strategist and mediator working with a dozen international agencies to evaluate interventions in divided societies