If the Iranian regime survives, the US image of victory will be ambiguous

Wars do not all share the same definition of victory. In what are commonly called asymmetric wars – conflicts between opponents of vastly unequal power and resources – the logic is almost paradoxical: the stronger side must win clearly to be judged the victor, while for the weaker side mere survival may amount to success.

That principle helps explain the conflict now unfolding among the US, Israel, and Iran. The clearest formulation came from Henry Kissinger in 1969, reflecting on the Vietnam War: “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if he does not win.”

From Vietnam to Hezbollah in 2006 and to Iran today, the central principle of asymmetric warfare remains the same: time is the strategic weapon of the weaker side. The idea itself is hardly new. During the Peloponnesian War, Pericles built Athenian strategy on endurance and the gradual exhaustion of the enemy. It is precisely this dilemma that Washington now faces in Iran.

The conventional military power of the US and Israel is overwhelmingly superior to that of Iran. Yet in an asymmetric conflict, military superiority alone does not guarantee political victory.

Washington’s strategic clock

President Trump has suggested that the conflict might last about four weeks. Such timelines in war, however, often prove fluid. Domestic politics also impose their own clock: the approaching US midterm elections in November will inevitably shape the political context in which the war is judged at home. At the same time, he is scheduled to visit China from 31 March to 2 April. Beijing is widely regarded in current US strategy as Washington’s principal long-term strategic competitor – what Pentagon doctrine describes as the “pacing challenge” reflected in the December 2025 National Security Strategy and the January 2026 National Defence Strategy. The war in Iran will therefore be watched closely in Beijing, as the US prepares simultaneously for long-term strategic competition with China. In an era of great-power rivalry, even regional wars become tests of credibility.

If by then the regime in Tehran has collapsed or been forced into profound political transformation, Washington will be able to present the outcome as a clear strategic success. If, however, the regime survives, the image of victory will be far more ambiguous. Even without regime collapse, Washington could still define success more narrowly: the destruction of the critical strategic capabilities of Iran, particularly missile and nuclear-related ones. This is how the war’s objectives are increasingly being framed in public discourse.

Tehran’s strategy of endurance

Tehran, for its part, appears to understand the logic of this conflict. The Iranian regime knows it cannot defeat the US and Israel militarily. It can, however, pursue something else: endurance. At the same time, the internal cohesion of the regime remains an uncertain variable. Signs of internal strain are visible within Iran’s leadership, even as the Revolutionary Guards appear to be consolidating their influence over key wartime decisions. The controversial elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader — reportedly backed by the Guards despite clerical reservations — hints at the shifting balance of power inside Iran. In conflicts of this kind, military resilience and political stability are closely intertwined. Recent apologies by the president of Iran to the States of the Gulf for missile and drone strikes — even as attacks continued — illustrate the complex relationship between political messaging and operational control inside the Iranian system.

For decades Iran has built a layered system of defence and response. In the current conflict, the Iranian defence structure – centred on the Revolutionary Guards and potentially supported by elements of the regular armed forces, the Artesh – is designed to operate with a high degree of decentralised operational autonomy. This approach, sometimes described as “mosaic defence,” is designed to absorb blows, preserve continuity, and raise the cost for the attacker. Even after losing senior commanders, the Guards remain capable of sustaining missile and drone operations.

Tehran also seeks to widen the theatre through a network of regional allies and proxy forces. The aim is not decisive battlefield victory but the gradual accumulation of political, military, and economic costs for the US and its partners. Here another critical variable enters the equation: time.

Logistics and the economics of war

Every large-scale conflict ultimately rests on two fundamental factors: logistics and economics. As Carl von Clausewitz observed, war is sustained not only by armies but by the material and political resources behind them. The decisive question is which side can sustain military operations longer and absorb the economic strain with fewer political consequences.

The US commands vast military and economic capabilities, but its commitments are global. The war with Iran could divert weapons and munitions from other theatres, including Ukraine. Israel, meanwhile, remains heavily reliant on US military support, even as its leadership speaks of reducing that dependence over time.

The Strait of Hormuz is not a side issue. It is central. Roughly one fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow chokepoint, along with a significant share of international liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows, making it one of the most critical arteries of the world economy. Recent developments in the area suggest the risk of substantial disruption to maritime navigation, underscoring how easily a regional conflict can trigger wider economic shock. In asymmetric conflicts, the economy itself becomes an extension of the battlefield.

Deterrence, endurance, and the paradox of victory

What is being tested, then, is not only the resilience of the Iranian regime but also the credibility of American deterrence. Great powers rarely lose wars on the battlefield. They lose them when military superiority fails to produce a clear political outcome. In the end, power is judged by results, not intentions.

The real question, therefore, is not which side possesses greater military power. That is already known. The decisive question is which side can endure longer. If Tehran survives – even badly wounded – the harsh logic of asymmetric war will once again be confirmed: the stronger power must win decisively to preserve deterrence. The weaker side need only endure. That is the paradox of victory in asymmetric war and the strategic dilemma now confronting Washington in Iran.