Against continued Turkish opposition, Sweden struggles for Nato membership

By Dr Andrestinos Papadopoulos

As the date of the Nato summit on July 11 in Vilnius approaches, the question of Sweden’s accession to the alliance is gaining currency because of Turkey’s opposition.

On May 16, 2022, the Swedish government decided to apply for Nato membership and on July 5, 2022, all Nato countries signed the accession protocol for Sweden. Until all Nato countries have ratified Sweden’s application, it has the status of ‘invitee country’, which states that Article 5 of the treaty applies to the defence of allies only. It is, therefore, clear that questions are raised about how Sweden can best guarantee its national security, as the war in Ukraine gives rise to a structural, long-term and significant deterioration of the security environment in Europe and beyond.

Long-standing security policy positions have been revised in a number of European countries in response to the war and in view of the lack of political will among EU member states to develop collective defence within the EU, the Swedish Riksdag approved the country’s accession to Nato on March 22, 2023, without discontinuing the deepening of Sweden’s defence and security cooperation with the Nordic countries and other partner countries with engagement in the Baltic Sea region.

Turkey, for political and other considerations, is blocking Sweden’s accession to Nato.

Ankara claims that Sweden allows members of terror groups, and in particular the PKK, to operate in Sweden. As a matter of fact, Sweden, by signing in Madrid on June 28, 2022, the Trilateral Memorandum, accepted the responsibility not to provide support to YPG/PYD and the organisation described as FETO in Turkey, confirming that the PKK is a prescribed terrorist organisation, preventing therefore PKK activities and all other terrorist organisations.

Sweden, honouring its commitment, has changed the terrorism laws, making it a crime to be part of these organisations. However, it is still unclear if this is enough for Turkey.

Those who are optimistic that a deal can be reached before July 11 must realise that a price is attached to it. The price is that Turkey wants the US Congress to approve its purchase of F-16 fighter jets, which US officials are reluctant to tie to the Swedish issue.

More recently, President Erdogan has put forward another bargaining chip. Turkish Airlines are planning to buy 600 aeroplanes for its fleet. Preferring Boeing over Airbus could indirectly exercise pressure on the US administration to give in on the question of the F-16s, a move which certainly facilitates the removal of the Turkish veto.

Missing the accession date of the next Nato summit in Vilnius because of a Turkish veto will certainly please alliance adversaries which include Russia, North Korea and China. To avoid showing that there is a weak link in the western alliance, it is imperatively urgent to preserve its unity and avoid sending the message that Erdogan is stronger than the alliance.

To conclude, with Sweden as a member of Nato, security in northern Europe would be higher on the alliance’s agenda.

Sweden would also be part of Nato discussions on its security architecture, including issues concerning arms control and military confidence-building measures in Europe, without abandoning as a matter of principle, its commitment to nuclear disarmament.

As a result, Sweden would gain greater influence on security and defence issue in Europe, and as a peaceful country would promote its agenda for peace in the region.

In this regard, I recall what a great son of Sweden, the late Dag Hammarskold, said at his inaugural speech when he was elected UN secretary-general in 1953: the biggest prayer of man “is not for victory, but for peace”.

Dr Andrestinos Papadopoulos is a former ambassador of the Cyprus Republic